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Many systems are designed to handle workloads with characteristics that are as-
sumed to be static. Today’s distributed systems, however, need to support a wide
range of applications that incur dynamic workloads. As a result, the ability of a
distributed system to adapt its operation to changing workloads is becoming an
increasingly important property. There are two main types of approaches for sup-
porting adaptivity: reactive approaches, which enable reconfiguration in response
to a particular workload change, and proactive approaches, which continuously
reconfigure the system in order to meet the demands of expected workload varia-
tions.
The type of approach a system can use depends highly on the available knowl-
edge on the targeted workload. On the one end of the spectrum there are workloads
whose changes can be accurately predicted, for example in the case of well- known
periodic effects related to the access patterns of a particular service. Proactive
approaches are a good candidate for such workloads since they can exploit prior
knowledge of the workload’s characteristics and drive the system to configurations
that better suit the target workload. On the other end, there are workload changes
that are very difficult to predict, e.g. attacks issued against the system in order to
degrade some aspect of its operation. For unexpected workload changes, reactive
approaches can be used to reconfigure the system when such changes are detected.
The focus of this dissertation is on designing and implementing distributed sys-
tems that support adaptivity. We present two main approaches, one proactive and
one reactive, for dealing with two different kinds of dynamic workloads. The first
describes proactive cache placement strategies for a cooperative cache built from
individual client caches in an online social network or web service. We evaluate
these strategies through simulations and compared with other common placement
strategies under different workload scenarios. The second approach proposes a new
asynchronous consensus protocol that we call Turtle Consensus. Turtle Consen-
sus works by reactively reconfiguring the consensus strategy as well as the set of
nodes upon which the strategy is executed in order to deal with denial-of-service
attacks. We use the resulting protocol to implement a state machine replication
protocol which is evaluated against various adversarial scenarios. The results sug-
gest that Turtle Consensus can achieve great performance under benign scenarios
and comparable performance while under attack.
This thesis presents actionable results from two ends of a spectrum of ap-
proaches to on-the-fly adaptation in distributed systems. While it is not the first
to show examples of adaptive systems or argue its importance, our contributions
significantly advance the state-of-the-art by pushing on boundaries at the ends of
the spectrum of reactive and proactive approaches.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Distributed systems design is often driven by the characteristics of the workload
that the task under consideration produces. Many of the solutions that appear in
literature [102, 58, 62, 50, 35] exhibit great performance under the assumption that
these workload properties are static throughout the system’s operation but these
systems’ behavior may change significantly if these properties change over time.
As online applications are becoming increasingly complicated and multifaceted the
corresponding workloads they generate exhibit characteristics that vary over time.
Such variations can be also caused by failures, changes in topology, connectivity
and geographic distribution of the nodes upon which the system operates [17,
108, 48]. In addition, today’s large scale distributed systems need to support a
wide range of applications and tasks with different requirements and workload
characteristics and operating under different configurations, which forms a highly
dynamic environment for the system [101, 92, 14].
There are two main types of approaches that can be used to introduce adap-
tivity in a system. First, there are those approaches that assume knowledge of
certain aspects of the workload and use this knowledge to proactively reconfig-
ure the system in order to meet the demands of expected workload variations.
Such approaches can be effective for dynamic workloads whose changes can be
accurately predicted, for example workloads that demonstrate periodic shifts in
access patterns or whose trends can be predicted by application-specific informa-
tion. Proactive approaches can exploit this knowledge and drive the system to
configurations that better serve the target workload.
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Then, there are those cases in which the workload cannot be accurately modeled
and predicted or where the cost for acquiring the knowledge required to proactively
reconfigure the system is prohibitively high. Denial-of-service attacks constitute
example workloads we cannot easily predict. In such scenarios reactive approaches
can be used that enable the system to reconfigure certain aspects of its operation
in response to detected workload irregularities.
This dissertation focuses on the problem of designing and implementing dis-
tributed systems that can adapt to dynamic workloads. It is divided in two main
parts in which two different settings are explored with significantly different dy-
namic workload behavior. The first considers content delivery in Online Social
Networks (OSNs) and represents a workload with predictable characteristics. The
second considers denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in the context of fault-tolerant so-
lutions and is characterized by unpredictable but significant workload variations.
Within these contexts both proactive and reactive approaches are discussed and
evaluated.
1.1 Proactive approaches for cooperative caching
The first part of this dissertation studies the cache placement problem in the
context of a cooperative cache built from individual client caches in an OSN or
web service. Motivated by the increasing popularity of various content-sharing web
services, the increasing availability of information on the clients of such services
and the advancement of technologies supported by client applications, cooperative
caching poses an alternative to traditional content delivery systems by allowing the
clients to cache and serve content to each other in a peer-to-peer (P2P) fashion.
This approach oﬄoads the service, naturally deals with flash-crowds, brings the
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content closer to its consumers potentially improving client perceived latency and
better distributes the bandwidth needed for content delivery across the network.
This dissertation proposes proactive cache placement strategies for a coopera-
tive cache built on the clients of such services. These strategies employ information
about clients’ relationships that OSNs typically maintain. Based on these rela-
tionships and existing knowledge on workloads that these services experience, the
proposed schemes proactively cache content on clients that are more likely to ac-
cess it. One of those schemes is parameterized for tuning the degree of proactivity,
thus controlling the scheme’s tradeoff between benefits and costs. The schemes are
evaluated against common and theoretically optimal placement strategies under
different scenarios using simulations.
1.2 Reactive Moving Target Defense for fault-tolerance so-
lutions
The second part of the dissertation considers fault-tolerance mechanisms and how
state-of-the-art designs fail to deliver under the presence of well- coordinated DoS
attacks. Such attacks can be viewed as unexpected variations in the workload
perceived by the system. By studying consensus, one of the core building blocks of
most fault-tolerance solutions, the dissertation investigates the design of consen-
sus protocols needed for building attack- tolerant distributed systems. This line
of work is motivated by the existing designs’ focus on guaranteeing good perfor-
mance under gracious executions where no failures or attacks occur but signifi-
cantly weakening those guarantees when the workload becomes adversarial. The
aim is to design a reconfigurable consensus protocol that can be used to imple-
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ment attack-tolerant systems achieving good performance in both gracious and
adversarial scenarios.
The resulting protocol presented in this dissertation is called Turtle Consen-
sus, and it is inspired by previous work on protocol switching [68, 106, 47] as well
as diversity [91] in time and space. Turtle Consensus is a round-based consensus
protocol that changes the consensus strategy on-the-fly when it fails in making
progress. It is a reactive approach to Moving Target Defense that leverages the di-
verse characteristics of the existing consensus protocols designs in order to achieve
acceptable performance even against protocol-specific DoS attacks. Turtle Con-
sensus’ design is general enough to support a variety of settings by limiting the
selection of strategies at each given protocol round. The implementation of Turtle
Consensus is described and evaluated under different attack scenarios, which show
promising results for dealing with particular DoS attacks.
To further strengthen this design, an extension to Turtle Consensus is also
presented that add another degree of freedom to the protocol. This extension al-
lows Turtle Consensus to switch between different sets of processes executing some
consensus strategy across different rounds. The design uses existing cryptographic
techniques to ensure that the reconfiguration of the protocol’s execution charac-
teristics cannot be predicted by even a strong adversary, capable of compromising
a limited portion of the system. The design is also extended to byzantine failure
environments where a bounded number of processes may behave arbitrarily.
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1.3 List of Contributions
In this dissertation we make contributions in both the proactive and reactive sides
of the distributed systems reconfiguration spectrum.
Our contributions on proactive adaptation are as follows:
• We propose two novel cache placement strategies that take advantage of
known relationships between clients (for example, social links) and the work-
load on the service. Both schemes proactively create cached copies of content
on clients that are more likely to access it based on those relationships;
• We evaluate our approaches and compare them with three common place-
ment strategies. Our evaluation uses simulation on synthetically generated
graphs and workloads that match certain characteristics of OSNs [10, 93].
Our findings suggest that we can substantially improve clients’ hit ratios
over common strategies at modest overheads;
• We also compare our proposed strategies with optimal placement schemes
that assume full knowledge of the workload. We show that, under certain
assumptions, we can get a near-optimal client hit ratio;
• We evaluate how our approaches work under churn. Our results show that
these approaches are effective even under moderate churn.
On the reactive adaptation side we make the following contributions:
• We present Turtle Consensus, a round-based consensus protocol that em-
braces reactivity by dynamically changing the consensus strategy at each
5
round. Turtle Consensus is designed to achieve acceptable performance un-
der DoS attacks that aim at exhausting the bandwidth of participants of the
protocol.
• We present our experience with a prototype implementation of Turtle Con-
sensus using two dissimilar underlying consensus protocols: Paxos and Ben-
Or. We found that we can achieve both good performance in the absence of
attacks and reasonable performance if the system is under attack while also
heavily loaded by clients.
• We further extend the reconfiguration capabilities of Turtle Consensus by
allowing it to additionally change the set of processes that participate in each
underlying consensus protocol used. We call the resulting protocol Moving
Participants Turtle Consensus (MPTC). While the sequence of configurations
used in each round is predetermined by a trusted dealer, we use existing
cryptographic techniques to ensure that next round’s configuration can only
be determined if sufficiently many processes collaborate in the current round.
• We additionally describe a byzantine fault-tolerant version of MPTC.
• We built a prototype implementation of crash-tolerant MPTC in which we
used the same protocol across different rounds and kept changing the set
of processes executing that protocol. Our evaluation suggests that we can
achieve the performance offered by the most efficient consensus protocols
even when the system is under attack.
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1.4 Roadmap of this dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents related work on coop-
erative caching, reconfigurable consensus, and denial of service attacks. Chapter 3
describes proactive cache placement strategies on a cooperative cache built from in-
dividual client caches in an online social network or web service. Chapter 4 presents
our evaluation of the previous cache placement strategies that we conducted us-
ing synthetic workloads and simulation. Chapter 5 describes Turtle Consensus, a
novel asynchronous consensus protocol that reactively changes consensus strate-
gies on-the-fly in order to protect the system under denial-of- service attacks. It
also presents our implementation and evaluation of our protocol. In Chapter 6, we
describe an extension to the previous protocol that enables Turtle Consensus to
not only change the protocol but also the set of processes that execute that pro-
tocol on-the-fly and in an unpredictable fashion using cryptographic techniques.
Concluding remarks and future directions are discussed in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
There is a wide range of previous work on supporting adaptivity and reconfigu-
ration in distributed systems that handle dynamic workloads for different settings.
Such work spans load sharing policies in homogeneous [39] or heterogeneous [74]
systems, in content distribution networks replication [69], routing protocols in mo-
bile ad hoc networks [49, 87], as well as frameworks for general distributed systems
focused on fault-tolerance [45, 27] and communication [107, 104]. This chapter fo-
cuses primarily on proactive and reactive reconfiguration and workload adaptation
approaches related to cooperative caching and cache placement in content delivery
networks (CDNs), as well as consensus protocols, protocol switching, attack toler-
ance, and denial- of-service attacks. The interested reader can find more related
work on adaptive techniques and reconfigurable systems in topics not covered here
like self- adaptive software [94], peer-to-peer systems [7, 70], and routing proto-
cols [6, 5] for wireless sensor networks. These great surveys contain both proactive
and reactive protocols used under various settings.
This chapter is structured as follows: In Section 2.1 we discuss previous reactive
and proactive approaches in cooperative caching in the context of social networks as
well as other distributed systems settings. In Section 2.2 we present previous work
on primarily reactive approaches in the context of performance, fault-tolerance and
DoS attacks.
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2.1 Caching in content delivery networks
2.1.1 Cooperative Caching
Cooperative caching is a well-studied topic, particularly in the context of web
caching [111, 109]. A representative system in this setting is the Shark [8] dis-
tributed file system, which uses sloppy DHTs to build locality-aware cooperative
P2P caches between proxies. Another such system is Backslash [100], a collabo-
rative P2P server/proxy caching for dealing with flash crowds using request redi-
rection and URL rewriting. These systems focus on cooperative caches on proxy
servers, hence they do not have the restrictions and dynamics of caches built on
clients.
Our system model is based on the Maygh [113] cooperative client-side caching
system. Maygh tries to reduce load on a web service by building a Content De-
livery Network (CDN) on the clients’ browsers. Another such system is Squir-
rel [54], a P2P web caching mechanism for geographically collocated clients (for
example, within the same company) that uses a DHT for achieving scalability, self-
organization, and churn tolerance. Our work focuses on Online Social Networks
(OSNs), which are not a good candidate for Squirrel due to its requirement for
geographically collocated clients. Also, neither of these approaches considered the
problem of cache placement.
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2.1.2 Cache placement
The cache placement problem has been studied in various settings. Several place-
ment algorithms for web server replicas have been developed and evaluated in [85].
They use workload information, such as client latency and request rates, to make
informed placement decisions. Our work performs cache placement by employing
social link information and client preferences instead.
The work in [67] studies cache placement for web proxies under the assumption
that the underlying network has a tree topology, modeling cache placement as a
dynamic programming problem. [18] focuses on minimizing load on the network
assuming a tree structure of limited depth and formulating a local greedy approach
for finding a near-optimal solution. The work in [89] considers various replication
and caching strategies within a simulated grid environment. The work views the
grid as a tiered system and uses dynamic replication strategies to improve data
access. Due to their restricted topology, these approaches do not generalize to
clients of an OSN.
[103] proposes a cache placement strategy in OSNs similar to ours. This ap-
proach, called S-Clone, collocates replicas of data of neighboring clients with re-
spect to the social graph of an OSN. Unlike our work, S-Clone replicates content
on servers and not clients, avoiding the limitations of small cache capacities and
churn. Also, S-Clone does not take workload information into account.
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2.2 Reconfigurable consensus
2.2.1 Consensus protocols
Consensus is a critical component of many fault-tolerant services as well as a tool
for reconfiguration of distributed systems. It lies at the core of replication pro-
tocols like state machine replication [63, 96] where it is used to achieve strong
consistency guarantees by establishing a common order of input requests at all
replicas. It is also is a basic building block in various middleware configuration
services like Google’s Chubby [20], Apache’s Zookeeper [57] and Microsoft’s Box-
wood [71]. In these systems, consensus is used to implement distributed coordina-
tion services whose fault-tolerance rely on a small set of replicas and use variants
of the Paxos [64] consensus protocol to keep these replicas consistent.
A wide range of crash-tolerant consensus protocols have been proposed in lit-
erature each optimized for a different setting and/or metric. Some were designed
to handle datacenter-scale systems like [24], which describes how Paxos was used
to implement a fault-tolerant database for the Chubby locking service, an instance
of which lies in each Google’s datacenter. Others are focused on wide area de-
ployments such as Mencius [72], which is a Paxos variant that employs multiple
leaders, each of which is responsible for a different set of consensus instances and
may reside at different datacenters. Another important differentiating aspect of
consensus protocols is the number of proposers. On the one end of the spectrum
there are protocols like Chandra and Toueg [26], Paxos [64], and many of its vari-
ants; they assume the existence of a special process, often called the leader or
the active leader, that is responsible for making proposals to the rest of the pro-
cesses. This coordinator-oriented approach has various advantages such as good
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performance even under high contention and low communication complexity. On
the other end, there are fully decentralized approaches [15, 86, 19, 9] where every
process can make proposals and conflicts are resolved using randomization. Such
decentralized approaches may be inferior in terms of performance in comparison
to the leader- based ones but their performance is not affected by failures as much
as the latter ones. For an excellent survey on consensus protocol see [41].
Our Turtle Consensus protocol can exploit these diverse characteristics of differ-
ent consensus protocols by switching the protocol under execution during runtime.
2.2.2 Protocol switching
Our Turtle Consensus approach draws inspiration from various approaches to pro-
tocol switching for optimizing performance under different workloads and fail-
ure scenarios, however, none have applied it to counter Denial-of-Service attacks.
[46] considers switching between primary-backup and state machine replication to
achieve adaptive fault-tolerance. Similarly, [105, 106] explores protocol composi-
tion to build more flexible and efficient group communication systems and makes
run-time decisions on the communication protocols used to optimize performance.
More recent work is the Abstract construction presented in [47]. In their work,
they use the notion of abortable Byzantine Fault-Tolerant protocols (BFTs) that
allow an existing BFT protocol to abort its execution and start another BFT
protocol that can handle the condition that lead the first one to abort. This way
new BFT protocols can be built as a composition of existing ones, similar to how we
use consensus protocols as black boxes and combining them across rounds. They
separate the optimistic and failure cases to handle them as separate instances.
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Instead, we are focused on the dynamic adaptation of the protocol to provide
good performance in the normal case but also acceptable performance while under
attack.
Based on the previous abortable BFT approach, [12] introduces ADAPT, which
enables dynamic switching at runtime by selecting the next BFT protocol to run
according to some objective function. Both previous approaches enable changing
BFT protocols across different instances. Our Turtle Consensus approach does so
at finer granularity by switching to different protocols across rounds, thus making
use of any progress in existing consensus instances. In addition, our Moving Par-
ticipants Turtle Consensus extension allows for further flexibility by changing the
set of processes executing the underlying consensus protocols.
[95] introduces the idea of “slowness oracle” to create an adaptive coordinator-
based consensus protocol which changes coordinator across round by selecting the
most responsive process. This approach is dynamic but it relies on the existence
of a special ordering module and can only change a single facet of the consen-
sus mechanism. Turtle Consensus on the other hand can change all aspects of a
consensus protocol during execution.
As an alternative to protocol switching, hybrid approaches like the one in [4]
combine characteristics of different consensus protocols to strengthen some char-
acteristic of consensus. The approach in [4] employs both the standard weakest
failure detector S and a random oracle to provide deterministic termination under
no failures or failure detector inaccuracy, and probabilistic termination otherwise.
The Turtle Consensus design allows for similar termination guarantees under cer-
tain implementations (for an example see Chapter 5, Section 5.4) but also enables
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the combination of a larger set of protocols which can be applied to more diverse
scenarios like denial-of-service attacks.
2.2.3 Denial-of-service attacks and moving target defense
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks involve compromised hosts that saturate resources
of the targeted system, typically the network, in order to prevent it from providing
the service it is designed for. They are a common threat and have been studied in
a variety of distributed systems settings, from internet web services [65] to sensor
networks [112] and smart power grids [76]. The attacks considered in the work
of Chapters 5 and 6 target the fault-tolerance component of a distributed system
by attacking one of its core building blocks, its consensus mechanism. Since such
fault-tolerance mechanisms are common in many distributed system we believe our
methods to be applicable in most of the previous settings.
There is a variety of types of denial-of-service attacks. A course-grained clas-
sification with respect to the weakness exploited [75] is distinguishing between
flooding or brute-force attacks and vulnerability or semantic attacks. In flood-
ing attacks, the attacker either floods the network with a large amount of data
in an effort to saturate the target’s bandwidth or have the target process a large
amount of data in order to saturate their CPU. TCP SYN, UDP, ICMP, DNS
attacks and others have been extensively used [83, 37]. Vulnerability attacks try
to exploit protocol or implementation-specific vulnerabilities to either saturate or
incapacitate the target. Example attacks in this category try to exploit network
device software or hardware issues like in the case of certain Cisco routers [30] in
which the password checking routine could lead to a buffer overrun. Other attacks,
like the Ping of Death [59], target operating systems implementations of certain
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protocols. In the case of [59], sending ICMP echo requests of length greater than
the maximum IP legal length could crash some of the targets. Some attacks target
specific protocol features (e.g. DNS cache [34]) in which the attacker can force the
target name server to cache inaccurate references. Finally, there are those attacks
targeting specific aspects of applications running on the target in order to drain
their resources. One example of such an attack is the finger bomb attack [3] in
which the attacker can cause the finger routine to be recursively executed on the
target, exhausting its resources. For more extensive listings and classifications of
attacks and defenses see the following surveys: [75, 37].
The attacks considered in this dissertation are a combination of both the pre-
vious types since they are using UDP flooding to saturate the bandwidth of the
target but also exploit protocol-specific knowledge to considerably degrade the per-
formance of the fault-tolerance mechanism. There are many more attacks in the
literature.
Moving target defenses have often been used as response to DoS and Distributed
DoS (DDoS) attacks. [44] proposes changing the IP address of the target node for
dealing with local IP-based DoS attacks. More recently in [55], Software-Defined
Networking (SDN) has been used to implement moving target defense approaches
like “random host mutation” in which, similarly to [44], the controller periodi-
cally alters the virtual IP addresses of hosts to hide the real IP addresses from an
intruder. Our Moving Participants Turtle Consensus approach (Chapter 6) resem-
bles more the “proactive server roaming” approach in [60]. That is an adaptive
approach in which the active server proactively switches servers from an existing
pool in order to deal with unpredictable and undetectable attacks. Their approach
ensures that only legitimate clients can track the moving server. Like in the case of
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our MPTC protocol, proactive server roaming performs gracefully during attacks.
However, it imposes significant overhead in attack-free scenarios, which is not the
case for MPTC since we only reactively change configurations. For a more in-depth
description of the challenges, achievements, and future directions on the topic of
moving target defense approaches see [56].
2.2.4 Attack tolerance of existing fault-tolerance solutions
While others have targeted good performance for the common case (for example,
[84, 61]), our focus is on performance under Denial-of-Service. In that sense, our
work is inspired by observations like those made in [31] and [99] regarding the ro-
bustness of state-of-the-art fault-tolerant state machine replication protocols. [99]
showed that a range of popular BFTs such as [22, 33, 61] are sensitive to network
conditions and that one-size-fits-all BFTs are hard to design. This strengthens our
case for an adaptive approach that can employ the wealth of existing protocols to
deal with the peculiarities of an adversary, whether the adversary is a rogue client
or the network itself.
The authors of [31] show that even a single malicious client can render the
system unavailable by carefully crafting a series of requests. They propose the
Aardvark protocol, based on a set of insightful amendments to the well-known
PBFT protocol [22]. These amendments concern signed requests, point-to-point
communication, and regular view changes, and render Aardvark more robust to
misbehavior of both clients and servers. Our work shares similar goals, though our
solution is to utilize a set of existing protocols and combining their strengths. Also,
Aardvark’s solution to bandwidth attacks relies on additional Network Interface
Cards.
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Our work can be also viewed through the lens of protocol transformation such
as [51], where the authors turn a crash-tolerant protocol into a Byzantine-tolerant
one. Our protocol can be categorized as such a transformation because it attempts
to transform consensus protocols susceptible to DoS attack to one that can grace-
fully handle that attack.
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CHAPTER 3
PROACTIVE CACHE PLACEMENT APPROACHES FOR
COOPERATIVE CACHING
This chapter investigates cache placement on a cooperative cache built from
individual client caches in an online social network or web service. We use a
service that maintains a mapping between content and the clients that cache it,
and propose cache placement schemes that leverage relationships between clients
(for example, social links) and workload statistics, proactively placing content on
clients that are likely to access it.
3.1 Introduction
The increasing popularity of today’s content-sharing web services such as Online
Social Networks (OSNs), photo-sharing websites, and video-on-demand systems is
leading to vast amounts of generated content. Services need to either rely on Con-
tent Delivery Networks (CDNs) and cloud storage to meet the increasing demand,
or build, deploy, and manage their own content delivery systems. Both approaches
are expensive and thus are often only accessible to large companies.
An alternative is to deploy cooperative caching [54, 113], where clients of the
service act as caches and serve content to each other in a peer-to-peer (P2P) fash-
ion. Cooperative caching has multiple benefits: First, it oﬄoads the service, thus
mitigating the cost of content delivery. Secondly, it helps with flash crowds [100],
since a flash crowd will provide the service with a proportionally large cache ca-
pacity to deal with the spike in demand. Thirdly, cooperative caching schemes
can substantially reduce access latency since content resides close to the clients
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themselves. Finally, it improves network resource utilization by distributing band-
width usage to many client-to-client connections, oﬄoading the service’s backbone
network.
Cooperative caching has been around for some time, but it has recently gained
renewed interest for various reasons. First, technology has become available that
enables easy deployment of such schemes. Maygh [113] is an example system that
leverages non-intrusive technologies such as Flash and WebRTC for browser-to-
browser communication to show the feasibility and benefits of cooperative caching
for today’s services. Secondly, there is increasing availability of relationship in-
formation between clients such as social links, users subscriptions to other users’
updates, etc. Such information can provide the service with better insights into
access patterns, which can be leveraged for efficient cache placement strategies.
This work focuses on how to better organize the client caches in a cooperative
cache setting and studies the cache placement problem for a cooperative cache
built on the clients of an OSN or similar content-sharing services. Compared to
our previous work [80], we have developed improved strategies, address the effect of
client churn, use more realistic workloads to evaluate our strategies, and consider
privacy issues that arise in cooperative caching.
We consider a system model similar to that of Maygh. Each client maintains
a cache of limited capacity for caching content and can communicate with other
clients. The service has a growing corpus of objects that can be requested by clients
and maintains an approximate mapping between objects and the clients that cache
those objects.
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Because strategically placing cached content can significantly affect perfor-
mance and overhead in such a cooperative environment [88], we investigate how
cache placement affects hit ratio and load perceived by the service and the clients.
We make the following contributions:
• We propose two novel cache placement strategies that take advantage of
known relationships between clients (for example, social links) and the work-
load on the service. Both schemes proactively create cached copies of content
on clients that are more likely to access it based on those relationships. One
of these strategies allows tuning proactivity, thus controlling the approach’s
tradeoff between benefits and costs;
• We evaluate our approaches and compare them with three common place-
ment strategies. We also compare them with optimal placement schemes
that assume full knowledge of the workload. Our evaluation uses simulation
on synthetically generated graphs and workloads that match certain charac-
teristics of OSNs [10, 93];
• We evaluate how our approaches work under churn.
Our findings suggest that we can substantially improve clients’ hit ratios over
common strategies at modest overheads. We show that, under certain assumptions,
we can get a near-optimal client hit ratio.
3.2 System Model
In this section, we describe the model we assume for our cooperative cache. The
model consists of two main components: a service and the set of its clients. We
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discuss these components and their interactions, and we consider security and
privacy implications of cooperative caching.
3.2.1 The Service and its Clients
The main role of the service is twofold: First, in response to a client request, it
either serves the contents of an object, or the location where the object is cached.
Secondly, it determines which clients should cache the objects. We assume that
objects are immutable; mutable objects are modelled as a sequence of versions,
each being an immutable object. Each object has an owner—one of the clients of
the service. We identify objects via keys that the service maintains in a key-value
store along with the corresponding immutable content, the owner, and the set of
clients that have recently cached the objects. Recency is here considered with
respect to some time window determined by the service during which a client has
been directed to cache an object. These directives are described in greater detail
later in this section. The service tracks which clients are online by monitoring their
most recent activity with respect to this time window.
Since we are focusing on OSNs, we assume that the service maintains a client
relationship graph which encodes client subscriptions to the objects of a particular
owner. In this graph, nodes represent clients of the service and edges represent
client subscriptions. Such a graph can effectively model an OSN where client sub-
scriptions represent mutual interest in the objects published by the corresponding
clients. We assume the service either has access to such a graph or can construct
it by enabling its clients to subscribe to each other’s objects. The exact details
of how the service obtains the client relationship graph are outside the scope of
this work. Our workload model is based on [16]: objects are accessed with a
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heavy-tailed distribution. The client accessing such an object is selected as fol-
lows: with probability NAP (Neighborhood Access Probability) the client comes
from the neighborhood of the owner of the object, that is, from either the owner
itself or one of its neighbors in the client relationship graph. Otherwise (with
probability 1 − NAP), the client is selected uniformly at random from all clients
excluding the ones in the neighbourhood of the owner.
The service interacts with the clients using what we call cache directives. A
cache directive is a message that the service sends to a client either as a reply to
a client’s request or as an unsolicited cache directive and has the following format:
(ID, C,D, L). ID is the identifier of an object (this can be a collision-resistant hash
of its content), C is a boolean used to indicate whether the receiving client should
cache the object or not, D is the content of the object (can be ⊥ to indicate that
the content is not included in the message), and L is a set of cache locations, that
is, a set of clients.
If a cache directive is a reply to a client’s request then ID holds the identifier of
the object requested. If D 6= ⊥ then the service is providing the object’s content
to the client and L = ∅. If C = true then the service directs the client to store
(ID, D) in the the client’s cache. Conversely, if C = false, the client should not
cache the object. If D = ⊥ then the content is not provided in the reply and the
receiving client needs to fetch it from one of the locations in L, and thus L 6= ∅.
To do so, the client will issue a side-load request to locations in L. We describe
side-load requests in Section 3.2.2.
If a cache directive is an unsolicited one there are two cases: First, the directive
is of the form, (ID, false, ⊥, ∅), in which case the receiving client must evict object
ID from its cache if it is there. Second, the directive is of the form (ID, true, ⊥,
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L), where L 6= ∅ and the receiving client must fetch object ID from one of the
locations in L and cache it even though that client did not explicitly requested it.
When the service issues an unsolicited cache directive of the second form, we say
that the service pushes object ID to the receiving client.
3.2.2 Client-side Caches
Each client is equipped with a cache of limited capacity that it can use for serving
client requests. A client may evict an object from the cache either when it receives
an eviction directive or when it has to cache an object and its cache is full. In
the latter case, the client decides which objects to evict using some eviction policy
such as Least Recently Used (LRU), Least Frequently Used (LFU), or Adaptive
Replacement Cache (ARC) [73].
A client can interact with the service and other clients using three types of mes-
sages: request(ID), side-load(ID) and cache-update(ID, U). When a client
requires access to an object, ID, that does not reside in its cache, the client sends
a request(ID) message to the service. The service responds with a reply cache
directive like those described in Section 3.2.1. If the response has a non-empty
location list, the requesting client sends side-load(ID) messages to each of the
clients in the location list, starting with the first one. A client receiving a side-load
request for some object, ID, checks its cache and if ID is there, responds with the
content of the object; otherwise it responds with an error. If the requesting client
receives an error or times out while waiting for a response from a location, it sends
a cache-update(ID, U) message to the service. The U component of the previous
message is a list containing the clients that did not respond in time with the con-
tent of the object requested. If the service receives such a cache-update message,
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it updates its meta-data regarding the clients caching object ID. If none of the
clients on the location list provided by the service is able to serve the object, the
client obtains the object from the service directly by sending another request(ID)
message. Once the requesting client obtains the content of object ID, it executes
the cache directive provided by the service according to C’s value.
3.2.3 Integrity and Privacy
Cooperative caching has significant security concerns. As clients are serving ob-
jects, malicious clients can modify them. This, however, is easy to prevent with
digital signatures [90].
A more difficult problem concerns the privacy of clients. If the server directs
client c to obtain an object from client c′, then c and c′ learn something about one
another, and in particular may learn something about one another’s interests. In
a previous incarnation of our system [80], it was indeed trivial to learn this. We
have made this significantly harder in our new approaches.
The main idea is the following: when a client c′ receives a request for an object
from another client c, c′ cannot know if c requested the object from the service or
whether the service sent c an unsolicited directive to cache the object. Vice versa,
c cannot know if c′ directly requested the object in its cache either. This gives
both c and c′ a level of plausible deniability. However, c′ still learns that c is in
the neighborhood of a client that requested the object. In order to increase the
amount of plausible deniability, the service can sometimes select random clients to
cache objects, similar to what was suggested for Maygh [113].
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3.3 Cache Placement Strategies
In this section, we present various cache placement algorithms. The first three
are intended for baseline comparisons. Next we present the proactive algorithms
we have designed, leveraging social connections in order to improve individual
client hit ratios. Then we present optimal versions of each algorithm, assuming
knowledge of the future.
3.3.1 Baseline Approaches
Opportunistic Approach
The opportunistic scheme is a commonly used approach for CDNs and web caches.
Maygh, BitTorrent, and Gnutella all use a variant of this approach. Upon receipt
of a request, the service checks to see if there are clients caching the object. If so,
the service responds with the locations of those clients. If not, the service provides
the object itself. In either case, the service directs the client to cache the object
(C = true), using LRU eviction if its cache is full.
Minimalistic Approach
The objective of the minimalistic approach is to minimize load on the server. To
do so, it tries to keep at most one copy of an object in the collective cache of the
clients. The scheme works as follows: When the service receives a request for an
object, the service checks whether the object was recently cached by another client.
If so, the service provides the requesting client with a singleton set L containing
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the client that has recently cached the object and sets directive C to false (that
is, it requests the client not to cache the object). Otherwise, the service sends a
directive to the client containing the content and sets C to true. In that case the
client caches the object. If its cache is full, then LRU replacement applies.
Minimalistic*
The minimalistic approach has two main problems. First, a client that has a copy
of a highly popular object becomes a hotspot since it must serve all requests for the
object. Second, in case of churn many client-to-client loads may fail. Minimalistic*
is a variant that only tries to minimize the number of copies held for unpopular
objects.
When the service receives a request for an object ID from a client c, it first
checks to see if there is a client c′ that has recently loaded the object. If not, the
service returns the object to c with the directive to cache it. If there is a client c′,
the service sends to c a directive (ID, true,⊥, {c′}), directing c to load the object
from c′ and add the object to its cache. Upon receipt, c informs the service. If the
popularity of ID is below a configured threshold, then the service directs c′ to evict
the object. The service approximates the popularity of an object by the fraction
of requests issued for that object in a configured window of time.
For small thresholds, the algorithm approximates the opportunistic approach,
because it is more likely that a copy of the requested object will be created on
each request (for threshold value 0 they become identical). For large thresholds,
the algorithm approximates the minimalistic algorithm.
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3.3.2 Proactive Approaches
Basic Proactive Approach
The basic proactive algorithm leverages the client relationship graph by proactively
pushing content to the neighborhood of the content owner. We here define the
neighborhood of the content owner, or simply client, as the set containing the
client itself as well as its neighbors in the client relationship graph.
When the service receives a request, it responds with either the object or a list
of locations, L, as in the opportunistic scheme. The response is always a caching
directive, that is, C = true. In addition, the service selects the dr × |Nowner |e
most recently active clients from the owner’s neighborhood, where r ∈ (0, 1], the
replication factor, is a parameter of the algorithm and Nowner is the set of neighbors
of owner . The service issues a directive to each of them to side-load and cache
the object, excluding any clients that appear off-line or have recently cached the
object already. Clients that do not have enough space left in their cache use LRU
eviction.
Common Neighbors Proactive
We also propose a variant of the previous approach that we call the common neigh-
bors proactive scheme. With this variant, the subset of the owner’s neighborhood
to which the object is pushed is the intersection of the owner’s neighborhood and
the neighborhood of the client requesting the object.
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3.3.3 Space and Time Complexity
The space complexity of the previous approaches is the state required by the service
to keep track of online clients and their cached objects. All approaches require this
meta-data and thus the space complexity for all approaches is O(n ·m) where n
is the number of clients of the system and m the total number of objects. Given
an object identifier, the service needs to provide the set of clients that cache it.
It must, therefore, keep a mapping from objects to caching clients. We assume
that m ≥ n, which is reasonable for social networks since in most social networks
users typically need an account to access data on the service and thus at least a
profile object must exist per user. Notice that due to the previous assumption,
the additional client relationship graph required by the proactive approaches—
which would typically require O(n2) space—is included in the previous bound.
The size of the previous state increases substantially as the number of clients and
objects increases, and thus additional measures need to be taken for keeping the
state size manageable in popular social networks. Such measures may include
garbage collection of old and/or unpopular objects and sharding of the service
state across multiple machines, for example, by employing consistent hashing, geo-
spatial information etc.
We consider time complexity with respect to the number of messages that need
to be sent until the client receives the object it requested. We briefly describe the
worst case analysis of a client’s request for each strategy. Each approach requires
sending a message to the service to get a location of the cache, if it exists, or the
object content otherwise. If a location is known, another message needs to be sent
to that cache. From this point forward each approach may differ on the number
of messages sent. In the minimalistic approach, a request will always be served
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after at most three messages. The first two messages are as above. The last one
is sent to the service for retrieving the object when the provided location is no
longer available, either due to time-out, failure, or due to the object no longer
being cached at the location. The remaining approaches are similar with respect
to the number of messages. This number is bound by the number of locations
provided by the service, that is, O(n). Notice that, by our model description, each
time a client detects a cache location unable to provide the object, it has to inform
the service via another message. This communication, however, is not crucial for
obtaining the object and thus can be performed in the background. The previous
bound can be very impractical and thus, in a real deployment, we could employ
some optimizations for reducing the number of messages sent. Such optimizations
might include trimming the service response to a fixed number of locations and
contacting multiple locations in parallel, at an additional bandwidth cost.
Table 3.1 summarizes the previous discussion.
Algorithms Space #Messages
Minimalistic O(n*m) 3
All others O(n*m) O(n)
Table 3.1: Space and message complexity of the cache placement strategies. Here
n is the number of clients and m the number of objects.
The previous discussion suggests that minimalistic is the best algorithm since it
performs better with respect to message complexity and equally well with respect
to the memory needed. In practical systems however, client specific metrics like
latency perceived and bandwidth spent to support the collaborative cache that
oﬄoads the service are more important. In addition, the cache described in Section
3.2 needs to gracefully handle the churn that is inherent in the peer-to-peer nature
of the system. As we later see in the evaluation of the approaches (Section 4.2),
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the minimalistic strategies do not handle churn well. Finally, we note that all
approaches scale similarly, though the proactive strategies do require additional
effort for managing large scale client interaction graphs.
3.3.4 Optimal Variants
For comparison purposes, we have also implemented optimal variants of all previous
algorithms. These variants assume knowledge of the future, which is provided in
the form of an oracle that knows the trace of requests a priori.
For the minimalistic and opportunistic approaches, the oracle is used during
the eviction process when the cache of the clients is full. In other words, clients
implement Belady’s optimal algorithm for cache replacement [13].
For the proactive approaches, the oracle is used for optimal eviction as well
as for optimal pushing. The optimal proactive schemes push copies only to those
clients that will be requesting the object in the future.
There are two flavors of the optimal proactive algorithm. The first one, which
we call globally optimal proactive, has the client push the object to all clients that
will request it in the future (and potentially outside of the client’s neighborhood),
excluding those that already cache it. The second flavor is called neighborhood only
optimal proactive and works as the previous one with the restriction that copies
are pushed only to clients that will request the object and are in the neighborhood
of the owner.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATION OF PROACTIVE CACHE PLACEMENT SCHEMES
In this chapter, we evaluate the efficacy of the cache placement strategies de-
scribed in Chapter 3 through simulation. We compare our schemes against com-
monly used cache placement algorithms as well as optimal placement. We syn-
thesize a workload to match characteristics of online social networks. Simulation
results of our proposed caching schemes impose moderate network overhead and
show considerable improvement to the client’s cache hit ratio, even under churn.
4.1 Workload
In this section, we describe how we generate the workload used in our evaluation
(Section 4.2). Our main focus is to capture workload characteristics of realistic
OSNs where clients may share and subscribe to each other’s content.
One of the workload aspects we are interested in is the corpus of objects re-
quested. We observe that the corpus of objects in OSNs continuously grows as
time passes (for example, due to photos and posts uploaded by users). As a conse-
quence, the relative popularity of objects decreases over time: old content becomes
stale and unpopular, whereas new content gets more attention.
To capture these observations, we assume a corpus represented as a list of keys
ordered by the objects’ popularities. We insert new objects in this corpus at a rate
of approximately 1/30th of the aggregate request rate. We consider key insertions
to play the role of writes and all clients’ requests to be the reads to the service. This
read-heavy workload is commonly observed in OSNs and approximates Facebook’s
key-value store [10] with respect to the read/write ratio.
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When a new object is added to the corpus, its popularity (that is, its rank in the
corpus list) is picked from a Zipfian distribution with skew parameter α. Once the
object’s rank is decided, its respective key is inserted in the corpus, increasing all
equal or higher ranks by one. For each new object, an owner is selected uniformly
at random from the set of clients. The key and content sizes of the newly inserted
object are selected from the distributions provided by [10], reflecting Facebook’s
key-value store and matching closely the object size distribution at Facebook [52].
Each time a new request is issued, we select the object according to a Zipfian
distribution with skew parameter α.
According to the model above, the popularity of objects decreases as new ob-
jects are added in the corpus. We name this model the shifting popularity model
(SP). This model was found to closely correspond to measurements performed on
Facebook’s photo corpus [52]. The initial size of the corpus determines the speed
at which the popularity of objects change. We revisit this issue in Section 4.2.
The time between client requests follows a Generalized Pareto distribution [10].
Request inter-arrival time is concentrated around ∼500µs.
The last component of our workload generator is concerned with the client
relationship graph that is used for selecting the client that issues a request for a
given object. The specifics of the selection have been described in Section 3.2.1. For
this work, we assume that the client relationship graph is static. This assumption
simplifies cache location selection and generation of cache directives.
We leverage a graph model to synthetically generate graphs of any given size
that share common graph characteristics such as node degree distribution, cluster-
ing coefficient, and others, with real social networks. There is a large number of
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graph models for social networks [66, 78, 23]. In this chapter, we chose the modi-
fied nearest neighbor graph model [93], G(n, u, k), because this model can generate
graphs that approximate real social graphs best. The generation proceeds in steps.
The model takes three parameters: 1) the total number of nodes, n, 2) a proba-
bility, u, that determines at each step if a new node is added or if a pair of 2-hop
neighbors are connected, and 3) the number of node pairs, k, that are connected on
a node addition. We derived the parameter values by fitting the nearest neighbor
model to a set of real world graphs found in [1]. Our objective function for the
fitting process takes into account the similarity of the generated graphs to the real
ones with respect to node degree distribution and clustering coefficient.
Our request generation procedure takes a client relationship graph G, the NAP
probability, and the skew parameter α as input and is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Request generation algorithm
1: procedure Generate request(G, α, NAP )
2: select a key k according to the SP model with parameter α.
3: if p ≤ NAP for p ∈ [0, 1] chosen uniformly at random then
4: select the client v issuing the request uniformly at random
5: from the object’s owner and its neighbors.
6: else
7: select client v uniformly at random from all clients
8: excluding the owner and its neighbors.
9: end if
10: return (v, k)
11: end procedure
4.2 Evaluation
In this section, we compare the cache placement strategies described in Section
3.3. We assess key cache performance metrics through simulation on synthetically
generated workloads as described in Section 4.1. There is a trade-off between
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the fidelity of a simulation and the scale at which we can run such a simulation.
In order to run the simulations in a reasonable amount of time, the number of
clients and the number of objects in the corpus in our experiments are significantly
smaller than in a popular social networking site. A large service will still require
sharding and multi-level caching such as used at Facebook [52], but this section will
demonstrate that medium-scale services can significantly benefit from proactive
cooperative caching. Existing scaling techniques like those presented in [113] may
be used for porting the ideas illustrated here to systems of larger scale.
4.2.1 Setup
In our experiments, we vary the number of clients n from 1 to 10,000 and keep
the cache capacity per client, c, constant at 5MB. Many browsers, particularly
on mobile devices, impose a 5MB limit on their HTML5 cache sizes [2]. We did
experiment with larger cache sizes and found similar trends as reported below. The
skew parameter of the Zipf distribution, α, is kept constant at 1.1. We obtained
this parameter value from [43], where a similar decreasing popularity mechanism
is described and found to approximate a popular social network. Experimentation
with larger skews also result in similar trends.
For a range of n, we generate a client relationship graph G according to the
nearest neighbor model (Section 4.1) with parameters u = 0.96 and k = 1. Then
for each graph G, we generate a workload of 20 million requests using Algorithm 1
with NAP fixed to 0.8. The NAP value comes from [16] and is consistent with click
stream behavior observed in social networks such as Orkut, LinkedIn, and others.
(In Section 4.2.6 we investigate the effect of using a small NAP.) The size of the
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trace corresponds to 150 minutes of execution using the request rate discussed in
Section 4.1.
Even though our workload implies the same number of requests for different
numbers of clients, the results do not change. This is because after the warm
up phase, and given the large initial size of the corpus, we reach a steady state
behavior with respect to popularity of objects requested by each client. Thus,
additional requests issued for smaller numbers of clients have negligible impact on
the metrics we are interested in.
For each client c, we monitor the following:
• hc, the number of requests it serves from its own cache (local hits),
• sc, the number of requests that are served by another client (side-loads),
• mc, the number of requests that are served by the service (client cache
misses),
• bc, the average bandwidth (over the length of the experiment) used to serve
content to other clients.
The metrics examined in this evaluation are the following:
• The average local cache hit ratio: ∑c hchc+sc+mc/n
• The collective (global) hit ratio of the client caches: (∑c hc + sc)/(∑c hc +
sc +mc)
• The average bandwidth spent per client on serving content: ∑c bc/n
A local cache hit means that the client can serve an object out of its own cache.
A global cache hit means that the server is invoked but the object is served from
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Figure 4.1: Average local hit ratio per client and global hit ratio of the collective
cache (a), and average bandwidth per client (b) for the opportunistic approach
with 10,000 clients as time passes.
the cache of a client. A miss in both means that the server has to serve the object’s
content.
An important consideration in our experiments is bias caused by the initial
conditions of the simulation, in particular the initial size of the corpus. The fraction
of objects that can fit in the collective cache is inversely proportional to the size
of the corpus. In addition, the selection probabilities of each rank in the Zipf
distribution change substantially as the corpus size increases for the first few million
objects. To reduce the effects of an initially small corpus, we initialize the corpus
with 10 million objects.
In Figure 4.1 we observe how the previously described metrics evolve over time
for the opportunistic approach with a configuration of 10, 000 clients. The corpus
is initialized as previously mentioned and the client caches start empty. The x-
axis shows the number of requests issued to the service from the beginning of the
experiment. A simulated second contains ∼2,000 requests. As the figures show,
each metric stabilizes after approximately 10 million requests. This stabilization
behavior is similar for all cache placement algorithms discussed in the chapter.
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In the following simulations, we begin each run with a 10 million request warm
up phase (∼75 simulated minutes), and then collect measurements for another 10
million requests.
We now summarize the various parameters that affect our simulations. We cat-
egorize them in three groups: First, there are those related to the cache placement
algorithms such as the minimalistic∗’s popularity threshold and the replication fac-
tor of the basic proactive approach. Both determine how many copies of an object
should be cached in the collective cache, but they target different sets of client
caches.
Second, there are the parameters associated with the workload generation.
These parameters are: i) The number of clients, or size of the client relationship
graph, which ultimately determines the size of the system and collective cache.
ii) The neighborhood access probability NAP, set to 0.8, which determines the
user requesting a particular key. iii) The percentages of read and write requests
in the workload set to 95% read and 5% write requests for all experiments. iv)
The skew of Zipfian distribution that selects the next key to be requested, fixed at
1.1. v) The key and value sizes (in bytes) for each object that are determined by
the Generalized Extreme Value and Generalized Pareto distributions respectively.
The former has parameters µ = 30.7984, σ = 8.20449, and k = 0.078688 and the
latter has θ = 0, σ = 214.476, and k = 0.348238. Both distributions are taken
from [10]. vi) The nearest neighbor model’s parameters, that is, the probability
u = 0.96, and the number of pairs k = 1, used for generating client relationship
graphs that mimic real social networks.
Finally, there are the parameters that are specific to the simulations we ran.
These concern the cache size of each client, which is set to 5MB for all clients, and
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Figure 4.2: Average local hit ratio per client (a) and local hit ratio running under
a churn rate of 0.1 (b) for a varying number of clients.
the session window. The latter is expressed in number of requests received by the
service before a client who has not issued any requests is considered as oﬄine. The
session is used to tune the churn in the experiments presented later in the section.
4.2.2 Base case comparison
In this section, we compare the strategies presented in Section 3.3. In the simu-
lations, clients of the service remain online throughout the experiment once they
have opened a session (that is, no churn). Clients start issuing requests at different
times however. Nevertheless, if there is a client caching the requested object, then
a side-load will be successful.
Some of the approaches described in Section 3.3 are parameterized. Minimalis-
tic* uses a threshold parameter that determines whether it creates a new copy or
simply moves the requested object from the caching client to the requesting one.
For all configurations discussed in our evaluation, we set the threshold to 0.1.
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Figure 4.3: Average node degree (a) and average number of replicas per key (b)
for a varying number of clients.
The proactive approach is parameterized with a replication factor that deter-
mines the fraction of the neighborhood of the owner of the requested object to
which the object will be pushed. In the following experiments, all runs of the
proactive algorithm have a replication factor of 1, that is, the requested object is
pushed to all neighbors excluding clients that already cache the object or are off-
line. See Section 4.2.4 for more information on how the replication factor affects
the proactive approach performance and cost. Our proposed proactive variant
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“common neighbors proactive” is denoted as “cnproactive” on all figures that fol-
low.
Local hit ratio
In Figure 4.2a, we show how the average local hit ratio varies with an increasing
number of clients. We see that as the number of clients increases, local hit ratio
increases slightly for all but the minimalistic algorithm. This is a consequence of
the workload model that we use and of the way that the client relationship graph
grows as the number of clients increases. Each object is likely to be requested by the
neighborhood of its owner because the NAP probability is 0.8 in our experiments.
As the number of clients increases, the neighborhood size grows as depicted in
Figure 4.3a. In Figure 4.3b, we observe that an increase in the number of clients
results in a higher number of object replicas per key.
Since the popularity of each object in each configuration remains the same, but
the number of users caching it increases, there is a greater number of users that
are likely to find it in their cache, in turn resulting in an increased local hit ratio.
Note that this slight increase is not observed for the minimalistic approach because
it only creates a single cached copy per object regardless of its popularity or of the
number of clients requesting the object.
The proactive algorithm performs best because it creates copies of the accessed
object on clients that are more likely to access them. By targeting the right clients,
the proactive algorithm increases substantially the likelihood that a future request
for an object will be found in the requesting client’s cache. With respect to the
local hit ratio, the remaining approaches are ordered according to the number of
replicas they create per key (Figure 4.3b). The more replicas for an object, the more
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Figure 4.4: Global hit ratio (a) and global hit ratio running under a churn rate of
0.1 (b) as the number of clients increases.
clients caching it and thus the higher the local hit ratio. The proactive approaches
perform considerably better, with more than 10% improvement over the reactive
techniques (the opportunistic, minimalistic, and minimalistic* algorithms).
Global hit ratio
The global hit ratio is the hit ratio of the collective cache and heavily influences
load on the service. Figure 4.4a shows global hit ratio as the number of clients
increases. More clients means a larger collective cache and thus a higher global hit
ratio. The hit ratio does not reach 100% because there is a steady stream of new
objects that are being introduced. Although the proactive and common neighbors
proactive approaches perform worse than the other techniques, their respective hit
ratio is only ∼4% lower than the minimalistic algorithm.
The minimalistic algorithm exploits the collective capacity of the caches best
because it creates no duplicates. As we will see in Section 4.2.5, the performance
of the minimalistic approach with respect to this metric is very sensitive to churn
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as only one copy of an object is maintained. The other algorithms create multiple
copies for popular objects and thus have less cache capacity for storing additional
objects. This is shown clearly in Figure 4.5, which depicts the ratio of objects
cached at the end of the simulation over the total number of objects cached during
simulation. The larger the number of replicas that an algorithm creates, the fewer
objects that can be stored in the collective cache.
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Figure 4.5: Ratio of objects cached at the end of each simulation over the full set
of objects requested for a varying number of clients.
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Figure 4.6: Average outgoing bandwidth per client (a) and outgoing bandwidth
running under a churn rate of 0.1 (b) for a varying number of clients.
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Figure 4.7: Average number of evictions per client for a varying number of clients.
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Figure 4.8: Local hit ratio per client (a) and global hit ratio of the collective cache
(b) of optimal algorithms as the number of clients increases.
Client bandwidth
Figure 4.6a shows average outgoing bandwidth per client as a function of the
number of clients. Local outgoing bandwidth consists of two components: side-
loading and pushing. The client bandwidth cost is proportional to the sum of those
components. Naturally, a higher local hit ratio lowers frequency of side-loads and
pushing (objects are only pushed to caches that do not contain the object). With
that in mind it is easier to see why the opportunistic approach performs best.
It performs no pushing while it keeps the number of side-loads low by creating
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a number of cache replicas that increases with demand. The minimalistic and
minimalistic* approaches cannot perform as well with regards to client bandwidth,
because they create fewer replicas and thus incur more side-loads.
The proactive approaches push content, which, as can be observed from Fig-
ure 4.6a, is more expensive than just side-loading. The reason for that is twofold:
First, for each side-load, the proactive algorithms will additionally spend band-
width pushing to a number of clients (the proactive approach more than the com-
mon neighbors variation). Although this results in increased local hit ratio, which
saves bandwidth, it also results in a higher eviction rate.1 This can be seen in
Figure 4.7, which shows that the proactive approaches aggressively evict objects
from the caches. Second, more evictions will result in more side-loads and thus
more pushes as well. Consequently, the proactive approaches spend considerable
bandwidth refilling the caches.
The common neighbors proactive approach has comparable performance as the
opportunistic one. It achieves this by limiting the number of replicas it creates
per side-load to a typically small fraction of the neighborhood (common neighbors
only). At the same time it maintains a substantially higher local hit ratio per
client, which saves additional bandwidth from future requests served locally on
the requesting client.
With all caching approaches, the average bandwidth for side-loading and push-
ing decreases as the number of clients grows. This is because more clients imply a
larger capacity of the collective cache. As the fraction of the corpus that can be
1Here we refer only to evictions that happen when a client’s cache is full and a new object
needs to be cached. Evictions initiated by the service are not considered. Unless stated otherwise,
evictions refer to those that happen due to the cache replacement policy.
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stored in the cache increases, the number of evictions decreases (Figure 4.5). As a
result, less side-loading as well as less pushing is needed.
4.2.3 Optimal case comparisons
In this section, we consider results of the optimal versions of the previously exam-
ined algorithms. This set of experiments identifies the best performance possible
on the metrics discussed. Figure 4.8 depicts the results of these simulations. The
optimal version of each algorithm is denoted by the name of the algorithm fol-
lowed by the “OPT” suffix. Note that for the reactive approaches (opportunistic,
minimalistic, and minimalistic*) their optimal counterparts are only optimal with
respect to their eviction policy. The proactive approaches are also optimal with
respect to their pushing strategies—they push content to exactly those clients that
will be requesting this content in the future. We denote by “ProactiveOPTN” the
algorithm that performs optimal pushing for each object within the neighborhood
of the owner. We include the simple proactive and common neighbors proactive
approaches for comparison purposes.
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 expose the potential of the proactive approaches for high
local hit ratios, global hit ratios, and low client bandwidth overheads. While the
reactive approaches are only marginally improved by an optimal eviction policy,
the proactive schemes get a substantial boost on all metrics by pushing content
optimally.
The optimal proactive approach (ProactiveOPT) achieves 90% local hit ra-
tio for 10, 000 clients and perfect workload knowledge. If, however, we contain
the optimal pushing for each object within the neighborhood of its owner (Proac-
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Figure 4.9: Average outgoing bandwidth per client for optimal algorithms as the
number of clients increases.
Strategy LHR LHR-OPT GHR GHR-OPT B/W B/W-OPT
Minimalistic 9.98 9.97 90.62 91.17 2.81 2.83
Minimalistic* 23.03 23.14 89.79 90.60 2.31 2.33
Opportunistic 45.02 45.97 89.11 90.31 1.51 1.51
Common Neighbors 54.97 65.21 88.62 90.54 2.64 1.49
Proactive 59.31 89.86 87.59 90.65 7.92 1.46
Table 4.1: Local hit ratio (LHR), global hit ratio (GHR) and average client band-
width in KB/s (B/W) for each strategy without churn and optimal variants for
10,000 clients. The optimal variants of common neighbors and basic proactive
approaches correspond to ProactiveOPTN and ProactiveOPT (from Figures 4.8a,
4.8b, and 4.9) respectively.
tiveOPTN), then the situation is drastically different. In fact, our non-optimal
proactive approach and common neighbors proactive approaches approximate the
ProactiveOPTN approach relatively well. The differences are within 7 − 10%.
This is promising because confining ourselves to the neighborhood of the content
owner is a reasonable choice given our target workload. Additionally, attempting
to predict requests by clients outside of the owner’s neighborhood may be harder
to achieve reliably and is less scalable.
46
4.2.4 Replication factor
We now investigate the effect of the replication factor (proportion of the neighbor-
hood that caches an object) on the proactive approach. We run a set of simulations
with 10, 000 clients and vary the replication factor between 0.1 and 0.9. The re-
sults of this experiment can be seen in Figure 4.10. We omit a replication factor
of 0, because in this case the algorithm becomes the opportunistic approach (no
pushing takes place); the results for a replication factor of 1 have been presented
in Figures 4.2a, 4.4a and 4.6a.
The findings show that as the replication factor increases both local hit ratio
and average client bandwidth increase. This is because the number of replicas
created increases with the replication factor (more pushing occurs) and thus more
clients are likely to find the content of their neighbors in their caches (Figure 4.10a),
thereby increasing the local hit ratio. The additional client bandwidth required
by a higher replication factor is fairly small. The global hit ratio drops with the
increase of the replication factor because the increasing number of object replicas
take more space in the collective cache, leaving less “room” for additional objects
to be cached. The decrease in global hit ratio is on the order of 1%, small compared
to the corresponding increase in local hit ratio (∼13%).
4.2.5 Churn
In Figures 4.2, 4.4 and 4.6, we present the results from a set of experiments where
there is non-negligible churn in the system. We model churn as the fraction of
clients leaving the system within a period of time. A client is considered to have left
the system if the last time it has issued a request was before a predetermined session
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Figure 4.10: Average local hit ratio per client and global hit ratio of the collective
cache (a) and average bandwidth per client (b) for the proactive approach running
with 10,000 clients as the replication factor increases.
timeout period. We simulate a variety of churn rates by assigning appropriate
values to the session timeout period.
In Figure 4.4b we depict the results of the simulations for a churn rate of 0.1.
The global hit ratio in Figure 4.4b has decreased substantially for all algorithms
compared to the results without churn shown in the same figure (Figure 4.4).
This is expected because increased churn means increased chance that a client
goes oﬄine soon after it caches an object. This in turn means that a subsequent
request for the object will more likely be served by the service. As mentioned in
Section 4.2.2, the minimalistic approach is the most sensitive to churn due to the
low number of replicas it generates. The more replicas created by an approach,
the less vulnerable it is to churn with respect to the global hit ratio. This is why
the proactive approach outperforms the other schemes. Consequently, the global
hit ratio of the algorithms is strongly correlated with the number of replicas per
key they create (Figure 4.3b).
The results regarding clients’ outgoing bandwidth in Figure 4.6b are similar
to those of the base case (Figure 4.6a). The main difference is in the scale of the
bandwidth ranges, which have substantially shrunk. This is because a large number
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Figure 4.11: Average local hit ratio (a), global hit ratio (b) and average outgoing
bandwidth (c) per client running under NAP = 0.2 for a varying number of clients.
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of requests are now served by the service and thus clients spend less bandwidth
serving content. (Recall that the service bandwidth is not accounted for in the
outgoing client bandwidth metric.)
The more surprising results are those regarding the local hit ratio in Figure 4.2b.
Observe that both proactive approaches are negatively affected by churn (Fig-
ure 4.2a). This is because the rate of clients going oﬄine reduces the number of
replicas they can create. This leads to a lower likelihood of a client finding content
in its own cache.
The opportunistic approach, on the other hand, is not affected by churn, giving
identical results as when clients remain online (Figure 4.2a). The reason is twofold:
(i) In our implementation the cache of each client is persistent throughout the mul-
tiple sessions the client may open during each simulation run. This is a reasonable
assumption given that we target client caches built on their browsers’ web storage,
which is persistent across sessions. (ii) The opportunistic scheme creates a replica
of the requested object on the requesting client whenever a local cache miss occurs.
The requesting client is always considered online because it opens or continues a
session by virtue of issuing a request. Consequently, churn does not affect the
number of replicas it can create and the local hit ratio remains the same.
The minimalistic and minimalistic* approaches benefit from churn with respect
to the local hit ratio metric. If a client caching an object goes oﬄine, the next
request for the object will generate a new cache copy (from the service’s perspec-
tive, no client exists that caches the data). When the client that caches this object
comes online and starts a new session, two copies will be available in the collective
cache because caches carry over different sessions in the same simulation run. Con-
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Strategy LHR (Churn) GHR (Churn) B/W (Churn)
Minimalistic 22.54 65.40 1.51
Minimalistic* 30.00 68.66 1.35
Opportunistic 45.02 72.15 0.92
Common Neighbors 46.59 73.98 1.33
Proactive 47.90 74.93 2.53
Table 4.2: Local hit ratio (LHR), global hit ratio (GHR) and average client band-
width in KB/s (B/W) for each strategy with moderate churn for 10,000 clients.
sequently, the minimalistic approaches can generate more replicas per key under
churn, which results in an increase of local hit ratio.
We observed similar results for higher levels of churn rate, though the differ-
ences were more pronounced. Minimalistic and minimalistic* did even worse with
respect to global and local hit ratio. In addition, the gap between proactive and
opportunistic approaches increased for the global hit ratio and decreased for the lo-
cal hit ratio. The results regarding bandwidth were similar to those in Figure 4.6b
with decreased bandwidth spent in pushing and side-loading.
4.2.6 Neighborhood Access Probability
So far we have investigated the behavior of client caches under workload charac-
teristics that substantially skew object accesses within the neighborhood of the
owner of the object. The magnitude of this skew is determined by NAP, which for
the results presented so far was pinned to 0.8 as literature [16] suggests for OSNs.
In this section, we observe the performance characteristics of the previous caching
strategies for NAP = 0.2, that is, a small workload skew. This means that 80%
of requests for an object come from randomly selected clients outside the object
owner’s neighborhood in the client relationship graph. Note that given the graph
sizes and the average neighborhood sizes shown in Figure 4.3a, setting NAP to
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such a low value renders the requesting client being chosen almost uniformly at
random, 80% of the time. The objects’ popularity and sizes distributions remain
the same and the read/write ratio is preserved.
We perform the same experiments as in Section 4.2.2. In Figure 4.11a, we
observe how local hit ratio is affected by the size of the system. Local hit ratio has
drastically decreased for all algorithms compared to Figure 4.2a, because objects
are now accessed by a wider set of clients. The ordering of the protocols with
respect to their local hit ratio is still as in Figure 4.2a because strategies that
create more replicas have a better local hit ratio. For all algorithms the local hit
ratio is not much affected by the number of clients.
Figure 4.11b shows results for the global hit ratio. The results are similar to
our prior experiments (Figure 4.4a), the main difference being that all approaches
show slight decrease in global hit ratio. This is because object accesses are more
spread over the set of clients, resulting in more replicas per object and less cache
capacity for storing additional objects.
The average outgoing bandwidth shown in Figure 4.11c is also similar to previ-
ous experiments (Figure 4.6a). Two points are worth noting: First, all approaches
spend more bandwidth because access is more spread out and more side-loads as
well as pushing occur. Second, the common neighbors proactive approach per-
forms similar to the opportunistic approach because it is less likely that there are
common neighbors between the requesting client and the owner of the requested
object for small NAP.
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Strategy # replicas / object # evictions / client % objects cached
Minimalistic 1.0 29 84.80
Minimalistic* 1.94 132 67.01
Opportunistic 3.52 536 40.95
Common Neighbors 3.87 1926 37.23
Proactive 4.83 7140 29.67
Table 4.3: Average number of replicas per objects, evictions per client, and ratio
of objects cached for each caching strategy for 10,000 clients.
4.2.7 Results Summary
Our simulations demonstrate how we can employ workload-specific information to
improve performance and efficiency of cooperative caching. With small overhead
on service load (∼2%) and cost in client bandwidth, we can substantially improve
client perceived latency (Figures 4.2a, 4.4a, and 4.6a). The relative costs of proac-
tive replica creation and placement decrease as the system size increases. This
suggests that our approaches are promising for systems of larger scale. By con-
trolling the amount of proactivity in our strategies (Figures 4.10a and 4.10b), we
can drive these costs to be competitive to the widely used opportunistic approach
while retaining most of the benefits of the proactive approach. In addition, our
proactive approaches approximate the optimal cache placement strategy on local
hit ratio within a relatively small range (∼7%) when the optimal placement is con-
fined within the neighborhood of the owner of the requested object (Figure 4.8a).
Our proactive approaches handle churn more gracefully (Figures 4.2b, 4.4b and
4.6b) because of the increased number of replicas created per object (Figure 4.3b).
Finally, our approaches remain competitive even under workloads with lower lo-
cality (Figure 4.11). Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 summarize the previous results for
10,000 clients and NAP = 0.8.
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4.3 Concluding remarks
In this work we studied the cache placement problem for a cooperative cache
built on the clients of an Online Social Network. We considered a service that
maintains a directory of content locations and that has access to the social links
between clients. The service provides the clients with hints about where content
can be found as well as where it should be cached. Given this system model, we
proposed proactive cache placement strategies that leverage social links between
clients.
We evaluated the proposed proactive schemes using simulations on synthetically
generated graphs and workloads whose characteristics match those of real OSNs
and compared them with various baseline approaches. Our findings show that
proactively caching content where it is most likely to be requested can achieve
substantial improvements in hit ratio over commonly used approaches at moderate
overheads.
We also implemented optimal versions of the various cache placement strategies
we considered. These approaches know the entire workload ahead of time. In one
of our proactive variants, the hit ratio is only ∼7% lower than optimal.
Finally, we explored the effects of churn and showed that our proposed proactive
approaches are effective even under moderate churn.
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CHAPTER 5
TURTLE CONSENSUS: A CASE OF REACTIVE PROTOCOL
SWITCHING
Consensus is a basic building block in middleware configuration services [20, 53].
While such services are designed to tolerate crash failures in asynchronous settings,
they may not stand up well to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Specifically, ma-
licious clients can carefully craft workloads that substantially degrade the perfor-
mance of many state-of-the-art consensus protocols. By exploiting protocol-specific
vulnerabilities, attackers can constantly force the protocol participants to slow ex-
ecution paths [31]. In this paper, we investigate designing consensus protocols
that provide acceptable performance under DoS attacks that aim to saturate the
bandwidth of protocol participants.
We propose a new asynchronous consensus protocol that we call Turtle Con-
sensus. Turtle Consensus employs previously proposed crash-tolerant consensus
protocols and exploits their diverse characteristics by switching between proto-
cols from round to round. Some protocols are fast under benign conditions but
their performance suffers greatly under attack. Other protocols may not be as fast
under benign conditions, but their performance may actually benefit from naive
attacks. By reconfiguring the consensus protocol on-the-fly we can achieve the best
of both worlds: excellent performance in benign scenarios and acceptable perfor-
mance while under attack, even if the client workload is high. We evaluate Turtle
Consensus against adversarial scenarios where at most one process may fail and
show that we can achieve better performance than existing crash-tolerant protocols
under attack.
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5.1 Introduction
Consensus is one of the most critical components for many fault-tolerant services.
The problem of agreement on state by a set of distributed processes is at the core
of various replication protocols like state machine replication [63, 96]. As a re-
sult, consensus protocols have been heavily studied from the early beginnings of
distributed systems and still receive considerable attention [77, 81]. In practical
settings where communication is asynchronous and faults of various severity lev-
els are a reality, previous work has focused on crash-tolerant protocols [24, 77]
and BFT protocols [15, 22, 33, 61] that can handle a limited number of failures.
One problem with these protocols is that their design favors primarily the “com-
mon” or gracious executions where no failures arise while only guaranteeing weak
timeliness guarantees such as eventual progress or liveness in the faulty cases. In-
deed, [31] shows that state-of-the-art protocols become almost unavailable under
certain denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by clients, the replicas of the replicated ser-
vice, or both. Certain design decisions made for good performance under gracious
executions turn out to be frail and result in bad performance while under attack.
One way around the problem is to build a front-end tier of stateless servers
that relay incoming requests to the fault-tolerant service, checking the validity of
incoming requests and filtering out the invalid ones. This is a solution that is not
only expensive, but does not really solve the problem as the attacker may be a
compromised front-end server.
The work in [31] proposes a new Byzantine consensus protocol, which addresses
various of the issues exposed. In this work, motivated by similar concerns, we pose
the question of how can we can leverage the design of existing asynchronous crash-
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tolerant consensus protocols in order to provide acceptable performance while un-
der attack.
Diversity has been proposed as a mean for building attack-tolerant systems [91].
In this proposed framework, different replicas may run different code or variations
of the same protocol (diversity in space) to mitigate correlated failures and thus
limit the damage from exploiting existing vulnerabilities. In addition, replicas
may change their protocols on-the-fly (diversity in time) as attacks or problematic
workloads are detected. In this spirit, we propose Turtle Consensus, a moving
target defense scheme for attack-tolerant consensus in asynchronous environments.
We present Turtle Consensus, a round-based consensus protocol that em-
braces diversity-in-time by dynamically changing the protocol at each round. For
this, Turtle Consensus leverages existing consensus protocol designs. Many fault-
tolerant consensus protocols have been proposed, each optimized for different con-
ditions or metrics. Approaches vary in many ways. For example, some consider
scale, ranging from datacenter-scale systems [24] to wide area deployments [72, 77].
The resulting protocol techniques range from leader-oriented [64, 26] to fully de-
centralized and randomized [15] protocols. As a result, Turtle Consensus can be
used in a variety of settings by limiting the selection of protocols in each round
to those applicable to the setting and metric of interest. Here we are focused on
achieving acceptable performance under DoS attacks that aim at exhausting the
bandwidth of participants of the protocol. We briefly discuss attacks that exhaust
CPU resources of participants in Section 5.5. The idea of alternating protocols has
been previously explored [4, 106, 68, 47, 32] though was mainly focused on high
performance under variable contention. These constructions do not address DoS.
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The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.2 we describe the system
model and provide some background on consensus protocols. In Section 5.3 we
present our proposed Turtle Consensus protocol and demonstrate its correctness.
Then in Section 5.4 we give some implementation details of Turtle Consensus and
describe how we implemented a state machine replication protocol on top of it.
We describe our experimental results in Section 5.5. Section 2.2 briefly discusses
related work. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.6.
5.2 Background
In this section we describe the system model, we specify the attacker’s capabilities,
and provide background of the protocols we are using underlying Turtle Consensus.
5.2.1 System Model
Our distributed system is modeled as a set of processes, N = p, q, . . .. Each
process can be viewed as a state machine with a potentially unbounded set of
states, making possibly non-deterministic transitions according to some protocol.
The protocol specifies the communication between processes, which happens via
message passing. A process can be either correct or faulty. A correct process
faithfully follows the protocol and is guaranteed to make progress given that the
conditions specified by the protocol at any given step are eventually met. Faulty
processes may crash (stop executing the protocol) at any time. We assume that up
to the point of its crash the faulty process faithfully executes the protocol. In this
work, we do not concern ourselves with the reintegration of a failed process into
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the system. We impose an upper bound t < |N | on the number of crash failures
that may occur during operation of the system.
Communication between correct processes is reliable, meaning that a message
sent by a correct process to another correct process will eventually be delivered. We
also assume that there exist time bounds on communication delays and the time
that processes take to execute transitions. However, we do not assume that these
bounds are known, and they can be arbitrarily large. Note that this is a stronger
assumption than asynchrony (and the well-known impossibility result [42] does not
apply), but much weaker than assuming known bounds on latencies. We shall refer
to it as weak synchrony.
The adversary has total control over the timing and identity of the processes
that can crash, though t limits how many crashes it can cause. In addition, the
adversary can delay communication and deliver messages in any order, but it must
yield to the reliable network constraint stated in the previous paragraph.
5.2.2 Denial-of-Service
The adversary can attack the system by issuing Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks.
DoS attacks saturate the bandwidth resources of one or more processes, degrading
their ability to participate in the protocol. In this way, the adversary can intro-
duce communication delays or control how various processes progress through their
transitions. By orchestrating the participation (or more accurately lack thereof)
of a limited number of processes in the system, the adversary aims to drive the
protocol execution into the most computationally expensive paths.
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There are other types of DoS attacks. For example, an attacker could use well-
formed requests that are known to impose substantial load on one or more of the
processes running the consensus protocol. CPU attacks using legitimate requests
can be mitigated to a certain degree using client puzzles [11].
5.2.3 Consensus Protocols
A consensus protocol, CP, is a protocol run by the processes in N , each of which
has an input value from some globally known set, V , and whose goal is for all
correct processes to agree on one of the input values [41]. Every process in N
can propose or decide a value and a decision is irrevocable. A consensus protocol
satisfies the following properties:
• Agreement: If any two processes decide, they decide the same value.
• Validity: If a process decides a value v ∈ V , then v must have been the
input value of some process.
• Termination: All correct processes eventually decide.
Different consensus protocols can vary significantly in their details regarding
the minimum number of processes required, the state each process maintains, and
how it manages that state. Our approach relies on the processes switching between
protocols so we abstract some of these details away to facilitate our description.
In this work, we only consider consensus protocols that operate in rounds. To
the extent of our knowledge most consensus protocols in the literature operate this
way, for example [64, 22, 26, 15]. The inputs of the processes comprise the input
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of the round. We model the output of a process running a round of CP as a tuple
(s, v) ∈ {D, M,⊥} × V ∪ {⊥} where D, M,⊥ /∈ V are special values. Let up be the
output of process p after completing a round of CP:
• If up = (D, v) where v ∈ V , then p has decided v.
• If up = (M, v) where v ∈ V , then if some process has decided, it must have
decided v. Formally: ∃p′ ∈ N, v′ ∈ V : up′ = (D, v′)⇒ v′ = v.
• up = (⊥,⊥) then no process can decide. Formally: @p′ ∈ N, v ∈ V : up′ =
(D, v).
Notice that (D, v) denotes a decided process, while (⊥,⊥) implies no decision could
be made in the past rounds. (M, v) intuitively means that the respective process
has not decided yet but it knows that if a decision has been made in the round,
then it must be for value v.
We now describe some key invariants on the outputs of quorums of processes
running a round of protocol CP. Before doing so, recall that a quorum in a
consensus protocol is informally a subset of processes that is sufficient for a decision
to be made. A quorum system Q ⊆ 2N is a non-empty set of quorums, every pair
of which has non-empty intersection. Note that different consensus protocols may
employ different quorum systems for ensuring the previously mentioned properties.
We define a quorum system QCP with respect to a consensus protocol CP as a
quorum system on the processes running CP such that a process cannot make a
decision before receiving messages from the processes in a quorum Q ∈ QCP .
A consensus protocol is called t-crash-resilient when it is correct (implements its
specification) even in the case where at most t processes experience crash failures.
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In an asynchronous environment crashed processes cannot be reliably detected
by correct processes. For the rest of the paper we will refer to t-crash-resilient
consensus protocols simply as t-resilient protocols. For any t-resilient protocol the
following property holds:
Property 1. Let CP be a t-resilient protocol running on a set of processes, N
such that |N | > t. Any quorum Q ∈ QCP must satisfy |Q| > t.
Property 1 stems from the fact that CP is t-resilient. By contradiction, assume
a quorum Q of t or fewer processes exists. Assume a configuration in which the
processes in Q propose v while the remaining processes propose v′, v′ 6= v. Because
Q is a quorum, processes in Q may decide v without communicating with the
processes in N\Q. Now assume all processes in Q fail, which is possible because
|Q| ≤ t. Assume the remaining processes are correct, and thus they are required
to decide by the termination property. Because these processes may not be aware
that v was proposed, the only value these processes can decide is v′, which breaks
the agreement property. Therefore no quorum smaller than t+ 1 can exist.
If a decision has been made by some process we know the following:
Invariant 1. If ∃p ∈ N, v ∈ V such that up = (D, v) after a round of CP, then
∃Q ∈ QCP : ∀p′ ∈ Q : up′ = (D, v) ∨ up′ = (M, v).
Invariant 1 states that once a decision v has been made, there must be a
quorum of processes that have either decided v or know that if a value was or will
be decided, it is v.
Invariant 2. There can never ∃p, p′ ∈ N and v ∈ V such that up = (⊥,⊥) and
up′ = (D, v).
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The invariant states that no process can be undecided if a decision has been
made. This invariant holds trivially by the definition of (⊥,⊥).
5.3 Turtle Consensus
We now present our Turtle Consensus protocol. Turtle Consensus is a t-resilient
consensus protocol that runs in rounds. Each round the system’s processes may
run a round from a different underlying consensus protocol, as long as they satisfy
the invariants described in Section 5.2.
All processes run the same underlying consensus protocol at any given round.
To achieve this, the processes either agree on the sequence of protocols ahead of
time, or employ a phase at the beginning of each round during which the processes
select the consensus protocol to run and its parameters. While we currently only
implemented the former, we describe the latter here for completeness. Depending
on the outcome of the selection phase, the processes run a round of the selected
protocol. Depending on the outcome of their execution they update their value
and decision state and proceed to the next round. We denote by op ← CP(vp) the
execution of a round of CP by process p given input vp and yielding outcome op.
A process’ outcome extends the output of the process running a round of CP with
the notion of timeouts—a formal definition is given later in this section. In the
remainder of this section we will describe Turtle Consensus in greater detail and
provide a sketched proof of correctness.
We assume that all processes have common knowledge of N , of the maximum
number of crash failures t, and of a set P of pre-approved, round-based, t-resilient
consensus protocols satisfying the conditions described in Section 5.2. We also
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assume that N is large enough to satisfy the liveness conditions of any protocol
in P . Every process i runs Turtle Consensus with as input the identifier of the
process (i.e., i) and its proposal, xi ∈ V . At any point in time each process i
maintains a state containing:
• its current round number, ri, initialized to 0;
• its proposal vi for round ri, initialized to xi;
• the outcome of the round, oi, regarding the decision state, initialized to
(⊥,⊥) at the beginning of each round; and
• a configuration ci ∈ P whose value describes the protocol that will be run
by i during r, and is initialized to NULL at the beginning of each round.
The set of possible values of an outcome is defined as:
O =
{ ⋃
v∈V
{(D, v), (M, v)}
}⋃{(⊥,⊥), (T,⊥), (DN,⊥)}
Values (D, v), (M, v) and (⊥,⊥) for v ∈ V are defined as the processes’ outputs
running a CP round in Section 5.2. When oi = (T,⊥) then process i has timed
out while executing a round of CP and thus failed to compute a value. Finally, if
oi = (DN,⊥) then i has not learned the configuration of the round and ci = NULL.
We explain how these may occur in more detail later.
In addition to the previous state, each process i knows a function Fi : 2V×N → V
which takes a non-empty multisetM of values from V as input and outputs a value
from that multiset. We consider M as a set of tuples (v,m(v)) where v ∈ V and
m : V → N is a multiplicity function that given v ∈ V outputs the number of v’s
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occurrences in the multiset. Given a multiset M, we denote the multiplicity of
element e ∈M by mM(e). We call Fi the value-update function of process i. The
only constraint we impose on Fi is that its output must be a value of the input
multiset. Other than that, Fi can be arbitrary, for example, employing random
coin tosses, using the multiplicities of values, and so on. Value-update functions
may differ between processes.
We use timeouts to ensure progress under failures. If a process stops receiving
any messages for a substantial amount of time at some round r, it times out. Time-
outs are used as an unreliable failure detector on which we rely only for liveness.
Recall that we assume a weak synchrony model in which communication latency
and process transition times have bounds, albeit unknown. Similar assumptions
have been used in the literature (for example, [26, 38]) to circumvent the well-
known FLP impossibility result of fault-tolerant asynchronous consensus [42]. Our
protocol need not know these bounds and yet can still exploit their existence. To
do so, we exponentially increase timeouts each round (by multiplying them by
a configurable factor larger than 1), such that correct processes eventually make
progress within a round without timing out.
The protocol runs for an unbounded number of rounds and eventually reaches
a state in which all correct processes have decided. Processes label each message
with their current round number ri and only act upon messages of their current
round ri. Messages from old rounds, either delayed in the network or sent by slow
processes that have not caught up, are discarded. Messages from future rounds,
that is, from processes that have advanced further in the protocol’s execution, are
queued to be processed when the receiver reaches that round.
Each round of Turtle Consensus consists of 3 phases:
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Phase 1: The processes agree on a configuration determining the protocol,
CP, they will run for this round. At the end of this phase it holds ∀i ∈ N :
ci = CP ∨ ci = NULL. If ci = NULL, i sets oi = (DN,⊥).
Phase 2: If ci 6= NULL, process i executes a round of CP using its current
proposal, vi, as input. Upon successful completion: oi ← CP(vi). If i times
out during CP, it sets oi = (T,⊥).
Phase 3: Each process i broadcasts its outcome. If ci 6= NULL, process i
waits for an outcome from each process in a quorum Q ∈ QCP . Otherwise i
waits for |N | − t outcomes from different processes. Let R denote the set of
received outcomes:
Case 1: If ∃o ∈ R such that o = (D, v), then process i updates its proposal
vi = v, decides v, sets its outcome oi = (D, v) and never changes oi and vi
again in any future round.
Case 2: If ∃o ∈ R such that o = (M, v) and ∀o′ 6= o ∈ R : (o′ = (M, v)∨o′ =
(T,⊥) ∨ o′ = (DN,⊥)), then process i updates its proposal to v.
Case 3: If (⊥,⊥) ∈ R or ∃o, o′ ∈ R and v, v′ ∈ V such that (o =
(M, v)∧ o′ = (M, v′))∧ (v 6= v′), then i updates its proposal according to its
value-update function Fi to a value in {vi} ∪ {v : (M, v) ∈ R}.
Case 4: In all other cases (i.e., @v ∈ V such that ((M, v) ∈ R∨(D, v) ∈ R)),
then i keeps its current proposal vi.
The process then moves on to the next round.
Algorithm 2 presents pseudo-code for Turtle Consensus. The SelectProtocol
function takes the set of pre-approved protocols and a round number and returns
either the protocol that should be run by all processes in that round or NULL if the
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protocol selection function fails. Messages in the algorithm are encoded as tuples
of the form 〈sender, data, round〉. The Broadcast function sends the input messages
to all processes in N . Messages for future rounds are buffered by the protocol and
delivered once the respective round is reached. To enable such delayed delivery,
we keep track of these messages in variable delayed msgs and provide access to it
in all 3 phases through the functions SelectCP, CP (stored in the configuration
ci), and receive. Note that operation receive(delayed msgs) delivers messages from
either the network or delayed msgs if it is not empty. In the latter case, delivered
messages are removed from delayed msgs.
We now describe the three phases in greater detail. Recall that at the beginning
of each round, each process sets its ci = NULL and if not yet decided, its outcome
to (⊥,⊥). In the first phase the processes need to agree on a configuration, in
particular, which protocol to run. There are various ways to decide on the con-
figuration. In the following description, we briefly present some potential ways of
implementing SelectCP.
A static scheme could select CP deterministically according to the current
round number. This way all processes in the same round know the same configu-
ration and can participate in the protocol. A more dynamic scheme could assume
a deterministically chosen leader for each round, r, say the process with identifier
r mod N . The leader of the round chooses a configuration and then broadcasts
it to all other processes. Any process delivering a configuration broadcast for its
current round can then start executing the protocol specified in the configuration.
One problem arising with dynamic configuration selection schemes is that some
processes may never learn the protocol selected for a round r when they reach that
round. For example, in the case where a leader decides and broadcasts the config-
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Algorithm 2 Turtle Consensus
1: Input: xi, i
2: Output: oi = (D, v) where v ∈ V the value decided.
3: State: ri := 0; vi := xi; oi := ⊥; ci = NULL; RecvMsgs := ∅;
4: wait for := 0; R = ∅; future = ∅
5: while True do . Run forever
6: delayed msgs = {〈j, k, ri〉|〈j, k, ri〉 ∈ future}
7: future := future \ delayed msgs
8: if oi 6= (D, vi) then
9: ci := SelectCP (P, r, delayed msgs) . select CP for r
10: if ci == NULL then . timeout occurred
11: wait for := |N | − t
12: oi := (DN,⊥)
13: else
14: wait for = |Qci |
15: oi := ci(i, vi, delayed msgs) . run a round of CP
16: end if
17: Broadcast(〈i, oi, ri〉)
18: else
19: wait for := |N | − t
20: Broadcast(〈i, oi, ri〉)
21: end if
22: while |RecvMsgs| < wait for do
23: switch (receive(delayed msgs)) . wait for a message
24: case 〈j, k, ri〉:
25: if @(j, o) ∈ RecvMsgs then
26: RecvMsgs := RecvMsgs ∪ {(j, k)}
27: else
28: RecvMsgs := RecvMsgs \ {(j, o)} ∪ {(j, k)}
29: end if
30: end case
31: case default:
32: continue . ignore malformed messages
33: end case
34: end switch
35: end while
36: R := {o : (j, o) ∈ RecvMsgs} . all received outcomes
37: if ∃(D, v) ∈ R then
38: vi := v; oi := (D, vi)
39: else if ∃(⊥,⊥) ∈ R or ∃(M,v), (M,v′) ∈ R then
40: vi = Fi({vi} ∪ {v : (M,v) ∈ R})
41: else if ∃(M, v) ∈ R and (∀o ∈ R : o = (M,v) or
42: o = (DN,⊥) or o = (T,⊥)) then
43: vi = v
44: end if
45: RecvMsgs := ∅; R := ∅; ri := ri + 1
46: if oi 6= (D, vi) then
47: oi = ⊥
48: end if
49: end while
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uration to the rest of the processes, the leader may fail and some processes may
never receive CP. We denote this outcome with value, (DN,⊥). If i ∈ N has
oi = (DN,⊥) then ci = NULL meaning that process i has not computed this round’s
configuration, and thus it cannot participate in the remainder of the round. To en-
sure progress under such failures, we employ timeouts and an outcome propagation
phase (Phase 3).
In Phase 2, the processes that have successfully computed the common configu-
ration ci = CP run a round of CP. Note that we can add CP to all messages sent,
thus informing receivers of this round’s configuration in case they had not learned
it in Phase 1. To keep our protocol description simple, we omit such optimizations.
If a process completes a round of CP, it updates its outcome to the output of
CP, that is (D, v), (M, v) for some v ∈ V , or (⊥,⊥). If, instead, the process times
out while executing CP it sets its outcome to (T, v). Once the outcome of a process
for the current round has been computed, it begins Phase 3.
In Phase 3, each correct process i broadcast its outcome and, if ci 6= NULL,
waits for an outcome from each process in a quorum, Q ∈ QCP . Otherwise, not
knowing QCP , i waits for |N | − t outcomes. This is because any set of |N | − t
processes is guaranteed to contain a quorum. (If not, the termination requirement
of a t-tolerant consensus protocol could be violated.) Once process i has received
such a multiset of outcomes, R, there are four cases to consider:
1. If i received a decision outcome, (D, v), then there is a process that has
already decided and thus i adopts the proposal and decides v. In this case, i
stops updating its outcome and proposal and keeps those for future rounds
it might participate in.
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2. If there is an outcome (M, v′) for v′ ∈ V and all other outcomes from processes
that executed CP and have not timed out are also (M, v′), then it is known
that if a value has been or will be decided, that value is v′. Thus, i adopts
v′ as its proposal.
3. If some process declares that no value can be decided in the current round,
that is (⊥,⊥) ∈ R, or if there are conflicting outcomes regarding the value
expected to be decided next, that is ∃v, v′ : (M, v) ∈ R ∧ (M, v′) ∈ R ∧ v 6= v′,
then no process can have decided in this round or a prior one. Process i then
sets its proposal to one of the values seen in R. To choose a value, i uses its
value-update function Fi with input the multiset,M, of values in R or more
formally: M = {(v,mR((M, v))) : (M, v) ∈ R}. IfM is empty, process i keeps
its proposal vi.
4. The only case left is when R does not contain any values, that is ∀o ∈ R :
o = (T,⊥) ∨ o = (DN,⊥) ∨ o = (⊥,⊥). In this case, it is not possible that a
decision has been made and thus i keeps its proposal, vi.
In Phase 3, a process with (DN,⊥) outcome waits for |N |− t outcomes. Phase 3
ensures that processes that have timed out will be updated on the progress made
by the processes that did run CP.
Correctness (Sketch)
Turtle Consensus needs to satisfy the agreement, validity and termination proper-
ties described in Section 5.2. To demonstrate these properties we assume that the
internal consensus protocols we use in Turtle Consensus are correct and already
satisfy the previously mentioned properties.
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Turtle Consensus introduces two additional outcomes to existing protocols
namely (DN,⊥), (T,⊥), both of which typically result due to a timeout occur-
ring during Phase 1 or Phase 2. Timeouts may lead to absence of responses from a
quorum of participating processes in a protocol round. Notice that any t-resilient
consensus protocol running with fewer processes than the size of any of its quo-
rums satisfies all properties (agreement and validity) but not termination. To
satisfy termination in Turtle Consensus, we first need to prove that:
Lemma 5.3.1. For any unbounded execution of Turtle Consensus, there will be
arbitrarily many rounds where at least a quorum of correct processes participate
without timing out.
Proof. First, observe that all processes will reach Phase 3, either by timing out
or receiving the messages required to finish the first two phases. In Phase 3 of
the protocol, at least |N | − t processes send their outcome to each other because
at most t processes fail. Moreover, any process, timed-out or not, needs at most
|N | − t outcomes to complete Phase 3 and proceed to the next round. Because
the communication between correct processes is reliable, each correct process will
eventually receive those outcomes and proceed to the next round.
The only issue remaining is the possibility of enough processes timing out on
every round such that no progress can be made with the remaining processes.
Because Turtle Consensus exponentially increases timeouts each round and due
to weak synchrony there exist bounds on communication and processing latencies,
eventually correct processes will never time out. Given that Turtle Consensus runs
for an unbounded number of rounds, there will be an unbounded number of such
“good” rounds.
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The previous lemma ensures that if the protocols we use internally in Turtle
Consensus satisfy termination when enough correct processes participate, then
there will be arbitrarily many rounds when these protocols will run with enough
correct processes. Thus eventually all correct processes can make progress and
decide.
To satisfy validity, every such decision must come from an input xi of some
process i. This holds due to following two facts: First, any underlying protocol
CP selected for a round of Turtle Consensus maintains validity. Second, the inputs
of any CP at any round are either directly the inputs of Turtle Consensus (in the
first round) or the values contained in the outcomes of the previous round (in all
rounds but the first). In Phase 3, if any process i updates its proposal for the next
round, it does so either by directly selecting a value from those computed by CP,
which by CP’s validity must come from its own inputs, or indirectly using function
Fi. Thus Turtle Consensus satisfies validity.
Finally, we need to show agreement. We observe that Turtle Consensus main-
tains the following invariant:
Invariant 3. If ∃p ∈ N, v ∈ V : op = (D, v) at some round of Turtle Consensus,
then the processes with proposal v can never change their proposal in subsequent
rounds.
If op = (D, v), then there exists a quorum of processes whose proposals are v
(Invariant 1). By Invariant 2 we know that ⊥ cannot be an outcome for any j ∈ N .
Thus, cases 3 and 4 of Phase 3 cannot occur when op = (D, v). In addition, if case 2
occurs, then any process, j, that has not crashed or timed-out and has not decided
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yet must send (M, v) by definition of outcome (M, v) for v ∈ V . Therefore the only
options processes have, are to either keep their old proposal or update it to v.
Using this invariant we can prove the following lemma:
Lemma 5.3.2. If some correct process p ∈ N decides v ∈ V at some round r of
Turtle Consensus, then no process q ∈ N can decide v′ 6= v at any round r′ ≥ r.
Proof. In order for a process to decide some value v at some round r there must
be a quorum Q of processes proposing v in that round. If a process decides value
v′, v′ 6= v, in some round r, r′ ≥ r, then another quorum Q′ of v′ proposals must
exist. For r′ = r this is impossible because quorums intersect and processes cannot
propose multiple values in the same round. For r′ > r this means that some correct
process with proposal v ∈ Q must have changed its proposal at some point after
round r, because Q and Q′ must intersect. By Invariant 3 this cannot happen.
Finally, we show that once a decision is made on a value v by some process,
the system converges to a state where all processes decide v. This is stated by the
following lemma:
Lemma 5.3.3. If some correct process p ∈ N decides v ∈ V at some round r of
Turtle Consensus then all correct processes will decide v at some round r′ ≥ r.
Proof. Let p be the first correct process to decide v ∈ V at some round r running
protocol CP. By Invariant 1 we have that there exists a quorum of processes Q ∈
QCP : ∀q ∈ Q : oq = (D, v) ∨ oq = (M, v) in the same round. As a result, in Phase 3
of round r every process will receive at least one of the previous outcomes and thus
may change its value to v or keep its previous proposal. Then by correctness of the
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CP protocols run at each round and by Lemma 5.3.1 every process will eventually
set its proposal to v and decide.
In order to show that all correct processes eventually decide, we have to incor-
porate liveness reasoning of the underlying consensus protocols. For example, if
for some protocols rounds terminate with probability larger than 0 and those pro-
tocols are invoked an unbounded number of times, then termination is guaranteed
with probability 1 [15]. If for some other protocols eventually the timeouts become
large enough so that rounds are guaranteed to terminate [38, 64], then this will
also guarantee termination for Turtle Consensus.
5.4 Implementation
In this section we describe our implementation of Turtle Consensus. There are
four main choices we need to consider:
1. What are the configuration options, that is, what are the contents of P?
2. How are configurations selected?
3. How do processes learn the configuration for a round?
4. What is the function Fi for each process i?
For the first choice, we used parameterized versions of the single-decree
Paxos [64] and Ben-Or [15] protocols. Both protocols can tolerate up to t crash fail-
ures with 2t+1 processes, which is the minimum number of processes required [36].
Nonetheless, these two protocols represent very different approaches to consensus.
Simplified, each Paxos round has a single leader that proposes a value that the
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remaining processes may accept—if a majority does so the value is decided. The
approach deals very well with contention, because a single process selects the next
value to try to decide. The approach suffers, however, if the leader fails or becomes
slow due to attack.
While in practice multi-decree Paxos is used to prevent having to elect new
leaders for each round, our version of single-decree Paxos is parameterized to start
with a predetermined active leader selected deterministically as a function of the
round number, allowing Paxos Phase 1 to be skipped. If the leader fails early on,
the remaining processes time-out and proceed to the next Turtle Consensus round.
Thus, in the good scenario, our Paxos implementation will finish in a single phase,
that is, a single round-trip message delay.
One issue with this deterministic leader assignment is that a failed process will
cause the others to timeout every |N | rounds. To deal with this issue we can
use application-specific knowledge associated with the state machine replication
protocol. We explain how later.
Ben-Or, on the other hand, is an entirely decentralized approach with no desig-
nated leader. Ben-Or uses randomness to resolve conflicts between proposals and
offers probabilistic guarantees of termination. Not having a leader, Ben-Or does
not suffer from crashed or slow processes, but behaves poorly under contention
because it resolves conflicts probabilistically.
To benefit from the different characteristics of the underlying consensus proto-
cols, we need to establish the rules for switching between one another and how to
coordinate this switch among all participating processes. In our implementation
we keep the approach simple: Switching between the protocols is deterministically
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decided as a function of the round number. In this way, any process reaching a par-
ticular round r can instantly start Phase 2 and run under the right configuration
without need for further communication. Our Turtle Consensus implementation
starts from round 0 and runs Paxos at all even rounds and Ben-Or at the odd ones.
Moreover, for the Paxos leader rotates as follows: if r is even, then the round is a
Paxos round with leader r/2 mod |N |.
Finally, every process uses the same value-update function Fpop to choose be-
tween values in the received outcomes during Phase 3, Case 3: Fpop selects the
smallest most popular value from the ones received during Phase 3.
To speed up termination, if a process decides in some round, it immediately
broadcasts the decision outcome. An undecided process receiving such a decision
outcome decides the respective value. In addition, if a process receives a quorum of
outcomes for its current round while in Phase 1 or 2, it will instantly enter Phase 3
with outcome (T,⊥) (as if it had timed-out).
State Machine Replication
We used Turtle Consensus to implement a basic state machine replication proto-
col [96]. In this approach, a deterministic state machine implements some service,
for example a key/value store. Client requests form the inputs to the state ma-
chine, and causes transitions. The results are returned as responses to the requests.
A state machine replication protocol (SMRP) uses copies or replicas of this state
machine, each starting in the same state, and each run by a different process. Each
replica is presented with the same sequence of inputs. Because the state machine
is deterministic, the replicas will go through the same transitions, producing the
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same results, and ending up in the same state. Clients can ignore all but the first
response. Therefore, if there are n replicas, n− 1 crash failures can be tolerated.
In order to ensure that all replicas receive the same inputs in the same order,
we model the input stream as a sequence of slots numbered 0, 1, ... and lazily in-
stantiate Turtle Consensus for each slot. For this, each replica in SMRP maintains
a private zero-initialized instance number.
Each client connects to a single replica and sends its requests there. A client
request contains a client identifier and a request sequence number for that client
to form a unique value for each request. Upon arrival of a request from a client, a
replica broadcasts the request to the other replicas so that, in the absence of fail-
ures, all replicas receive the request. Regardless of the request’s origin, a replica
that receives a request uses its instance number to instantiate Turtle Consensus lo-
cally for that slot using the request as its initial proposal. Depending on the request
arrival order, different replicas may propose the same request for different instances
of Turtle Consensus. Conversely, each replica may run different instances of Turtle
Consensus concurrently for multiple client requests. In order to avoid spawning
and managing an excessive number of instances, each replica has a threshold on
the maximum number of concurrent instances. Additional requests received are
queued until the number of concurrent instances drops below this threshold.
Turtle Consensus messages are tagged with the instance they belong to. When
a process receives a message for an instance it has not yet instantiated, the process
simply buffers the message until it has been instantiated.
When a Turtle Consensus instance decides some request, the replica logs the de-
cision and notifies the source of the request (either a client or the relaying replica).
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At this point the state that the process associates with this Turtle Consensus in-
stance can be garbage collected. If the replica later receives a message for such
a garbage collected instance, it can reply to the sender with the outcome of the
round as stored in the log. The sender can then decide as well, and likewise garbage
collect its state.
Because the same request may be proposed by different replicas in different
instances, it is possible that the same client request is decided for multiple slots.
Except for the first, the other decisions are treated as no-ops.
Conversely, a request that is proposed in some instance may not be decided by
that instance. In order to deal with this issue, each replica maintains a set of all
requests that it has proposed but that have not yet been decided. Once there are
no outstanding instances, the replica checks to see if this set is empty. If not, the
replica creates additional instances. For liveness, clients that connect to crashed
replicas should reconnect to another replica and retransmit their outstanding re-
quests.
To deal with the issue caused by deterministic leader assignment for each round,
we exploit the configuration window, W , of the SMRP protocol, which determines
the number of consensus instances for which there are pending proposals. We
attach to each proposal the identifier of the proposing leader. Once the instance
decides, the processes learn and log the respective leader’s identifier. Processes
running Paxos for some instance x can determine the Phase 2 leader by looking up
the process whose value was decided in instance x −W . If a process fails, it will
stop making proposals and its identifier will eventually disappear from the other
processes’ logs, and thus will not be used as a leader in future instances.
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5.5 Evaluation
In this section, we describe how we evaluated Turtle Consensus in the face of
various attack scenarios. In Section 5.5.1, we describe our experimental testbed,
the attacks, and the parameters of our executions. Then, in Section 5.5.2, we
present our findings.
5.5.1 Experiment Setup
We implemented Turtle Consensus and state machine replication in C++. Our
testbed consists of 5 nodes in Emulab [110], each with 4 cores running at 2.4 GHz,
with 12GB of memory. The nodes are connected by 1Gbps switched Ethernet. All
communication is over TCP/IP. In our experiments we used t = 1. Three of these
nodes where designated as the 2t+ 1 participants needed for Turtle Consensus. Of
the two remaining nodes, one node is used as attacker, while the other node runs
one or more client threads. By running the attacker on a different node, bandwidth
attacks do not directly affect the clients’ ability to issue requests to the service.
For simplicity of implementation of SMRP we also used 3 replicas, even though
technically only t+1 are necessary. However, client threads only connect to t+1 = 2
of the replicas. This benefits Ben-Or rounds: With only two replicas receiving re-
quests, at most two different values may be used as input for each Turtle Consensus
instance, reducing contention compared to using three replicas.
A typical execution of our implementation of SMRP proceeds as follows: Each
client thread connects to one of the two replicas, in a round-robin fashion for load
balancing purposes, and starts issuing requests. Client threads run in a simple
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loop consisting of sending a request and waiting for a response before sending the
next request.
The attacker node also consists of a set of threads, which we call attack threads.
Each of these attack threads targets one replica and sends dummy messages of fixed
length as fast as it can. These dummy messages are not requests and are dismissed
instantly by the replica. The attack aims to saturate the replica’s bandwidth,
disabling them from participating in Turtle Consensus instances if fully successful.
The attacker can direct all its threads at a single node or spread them among
multiple replicas. Because there is only a single attacker node, the aggregate
attack can produce at most 1Gbit/s worth of bandwidth.
In our experiments we measured throughput and latency, both at the client
side. Throughput is the aggregate number of operations per second completed by
client threads. While SMRP might decide the same request more than once, they
are only counted once, thus the throughput we are measuring is not the actual
number of instances completed per second on each replica.
By load on the service we mean the number of client threads issuing requests.
Its value ranges between 2 and 128 client threads spread evenly among the two
designated replicas. Each replica has the same number of client threads connected
at each run of the experiment. Each run lasted one minute, which we found
sufficient to mask any start-up bias that might occur—the performance metrics
were not affected substantially in longer runs. In all our experiments, we used 100
byte payloads.
On the attacker’s side the main two parameters are the size of dummy messages
sent by each attack thread and the number of attack threads. For the first we picked
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200 bytes, which we found sufficient to saturate a 1Gbit link even with a single
attack thread. However, we used 8 attacker threads so they could saturate a link
to a replica even when sharing it with 64 client threads connected over the same
link. Note that 8 attacker threads can send much faster than 64 client threads
because the latter are waiting for responses while the former do not.
We used an initial timeout of 1ms for each Turtle Consensus instance, doubling
the timeout every round a process times out without having reached a decision.
In our experiments we do not consider any server crashes.
5.5.2 Results
We first examine Turtle Consensus when running Paxos on every round. In this
Turtle Consensus configuration, the leader is the same in each Turtle Consensus
round and instance. We will refer to this configuration of Turtle Consensus as TC-
Paxos. In Figure 5.1 we observe aggregate TC-Paxos throughput as a function of
the number of client threads under different attack scenarios. The top line shows
throughput without any attacks taking place.
The first attack we consider is when an attacker spreads its attack threads
evenly among all replicas, saturating approximately 1/3rd of the bandwidth to
each replica. This does not affect TC-Paxos performance much because the client
requests are relatively small.
The next attack, denoted as “attack on non-active leader” in Figure 5.1 is where
the attacker tries to saturate the bandwidth of one of the replicas, but not the node
where the leader resides. In each experiment, the attacker picks one of the two
remaining nodes at random to attack. In this case, we observe a substantial gap
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Figure 5.1: Paxos throughput as a function of load and various attack scenarios.
in throughput compared to the case with no attacks. The reason is that when the
attacker happens to hit a node that client threads connect to, those client threads
(half of all client threads) experience high latency and low throughput during the
experiment, bringing the aggregate throughput down substantially.
In the final attack scenario the attacker targets the leader. As seen in Figure 5.1,
throughput plummets. This is to be expected: the leader becomes unresponsive,
and Turtle Consensus keeps timing out after ever-increasing periods of time. In
practice, a Paxos implementation would move the leader role to another replica,
and notify the clients (because sending requests directly to the current leader
reduces latency). The attacker can exploit this to always know where the current
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Figure 5.2: TC-BenOr throughput as a function of load and various attack scenar-
ios.
leader resides. Later in this section we will investigate how well the attacker can
track the leader.
Next we investigate Turtle Consensus when instantiating Ben-Or in each round
(Figure 5.2). We refer to this as TC-BenOr. If we compare TC-Paxos with TC-
BenOr performance without attacks, then we observe a substantial gap between
the two approaches. The leader-based approach of TC-Paxos deals well with con-
tention and usually only requires a single round-trip to decide. However, the
probabilistic approach of TC-BenOr often requires multiple rounds to resolve con-
flicts. Moreover, TC-BenOr’s per-round communication overhead is substantially
higher.
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We consider two attack scenarios. First, when the attacker attacks every replica
equally, TC-BenOr throughput drops similarly to that of Paxos (notice the different
scales on Figures 5.1 and 5.2). There is enough bandwidth left over on each replica
to give clients satisfactory performance. Next, consider the case where the attacker
randomly selects one of the replicas to focus its attack. If a node that client
threads connect to is attacked, those client threads witness a significant drop in
performance.
There is, however, another issue as well. With only two effective consensus
participants, TC-BenOr takes more rounds to decide than when all three are op-
erational. Recall that client threads connect to only two of the replicas, and thus
contention is usually only between two proposals at a time. With three partici-
pants, one of the proposals typically gets outvoted in the first round, whereas with
two effective participants, decision depends on the outcome of the random choices
that the participants make. Thus, under this attack, higher contention results in
lower throughput.
Finally, we note that all three cases experience a small drop in performance
going from two client threads to four. We believe that this is because at four client
threads the likelihood of conflicting proposals in TC-BenOr rounds is higher than
with two client threads, which means that TC-BenOr will likely require more than
one round to decide. Beyond four client threads, the additional requests increases
the number of concurrent TC-BenOr instances, increasing node utilization and
thus throughput.
Next we consider the configuration we described in Section 5.4 in which Turtle
Consensus runs Paxos at even rounds (starting with the first round) and Ben-Or
at odd ones. We denote this configuration TC-Both and show its performance in
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Figure 5.3: Turtle Consensus throughput (a) and latency(b) as a function of load
alternating between Paxos and Ben-Or with and without attack.
Figure 5.3a. In the case without attack, we see almost the same throughput as
TC-Paxos, which is expected because a Paxos round decides on the first round in
the absence of failures.
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If, however, the leader is attacked, the Paxos round will likely time out (af-
ter 1ms) and a Ben-Or round starts. Paxos and Ben-Or rounds keep alternating
with timeouts doubling each round. TC-Both provides acceptable performance
under high load and attack. TC-Both under attack even outperforms TC-BenOr
when not under attack. This can be explained because the attacker targets ex-
plicitly the Paxos leader, which happens to be one of the replicas that receives
requests. Of the other two replicas, only one receives requests. Therefore the
Ben-Or rounds experience little no contention and are likely to decide.
Figure 5.3b shows latency measurements for the same experiment. TC-Both
under no attacks shows the latency achieved by our TC-Paxos implementation in
the normal case. In the case of an attack on the Paxos leader, the minimum latency
starts at around 1ms as expected due to our initial timeout value. Otherwise both
latencies grow approximately linear in the number of client threads increases. This
is as expected, as the service can only handle a constant number of requests per
second, and thus client threads have to await their turns.
Up until now we kept the Paxos leader on the same node, modeling the case
where the attacker knows exactly the location of the leader of the current round.
In reality, however, rounds do not actually run one at a time and there is some
overlap. It may not always be possible for the attacker to know exactly which
node to attack if the leader role changes position. In the final experiment, we
reconsider TC-Paxos but have its leader rotate among the server nodes on each
round. The attacker is now dynamic and tries to follow the leader. Replicas notify
clients (both legitimate clients and attackers) where the current leader resides.
Due to our small initial timeout period, however, it is difficult for the attacker
to prevent the second round from deciding quickly. Figure 5.4 demonstrates that
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Figure 5.4: Turtle Consensus throughput as a function of load running Paxos with
different leader on each round.
the attacker finds out too late that there is a new leader. As part of our ongoing
research, we are trying to find ways to make the attacker better at predicting where
to focus the attack. At the same time, we are also experimenting with selecting
leaders randomly to raise the bar for successful attacks.
Finally, we conducted experiments with larger numbers of replicas (4 and 5).
The trends were similar, the main difference being that throughput was lower
and average client latency higher. That is to be expected because communication
complexity increases for larger number of replicas for both Paxos and Ben-Or.
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5.6 Concluding remarks
In this work, we presented a moving target defense approach to deal with Denial-
of-Service attacks on a service that uses crash-tolerant consensus. Our protocol,
called Turtle Consensus, rapidly changes consensus strategies, which we believe to
be important in enhancing a system’s resistance to DoS attacks, particularly if they
are executed to target specific consensus protocols. We presented our experience
with a prototype implementation using two dissimilar underlying consensus pro-
tocols: Paxos and Ben-Or, and found that we can achieve both good performance
in the absence of attacks and reasonable performance if the system is under attack
while also heavily loaded by clients.
Our intention is to consider more sophisticated DoS attacks, while also toler-
ating Byzantine failures of the replicas themselves. Also, in our current prototype
the sequence of underlying consensus protocols is fixed a priori, but we wish to
make this dynamic and possibly adapt to any ongoing attacks. We also want to
explore the efficiency of our construction, and investigate how we can use Turtle
Consensus in larger scale settings by switching not only the protocols but also the
set of nodes participating in each round. Finally, we would like to deploy Turtle
Consensus in a real service to investigate its effectiveness against DoS attacks.
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CHAPTER 6
MOVING PARTICIPANTS TURTLE CONSENSUS
In this chapter we describe an extension to the previously described Turtle
Consensus protocol. This extension, that we call Moving Participants Turtle Con-
sensus (MPTC), enables the protocol to not only change the consensus strategy
on-the-fly but also the set of processes that execute that strategy. MPTC uses
these moving target defense strategies to tolerate certain Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks issued by an adversary capable of compromising a bounded portion of the
system. It uses existing cryptographic techniques to ensure that reconfiguration
takes place in an unpredictable fashion thus eliminating the adversary’s advantage
on predicting protocol and execution-specific information that can be used against
the protocol.
We implement MPTC as well as a State Machine Replication protocol and
evaluate our design under different attack scenarios. Our evaluation shows that
MPTC approximates best case scenario performance even under a well-coordinated
DoS attack.
6.1 Introduction
The Turtle Consensus protocol described in Chapter 5, was our first attempt in
devising a flexible reactive approach for solving consensus in adversarial environ-
ments. It employs fine-grained reconfiguration that significantly changes the attack
surface of the protocol, thus making it more robust against protocol targeted at-
tacks. The main strategy of Turtle Consensus is based on using the best approach
available for normal operation in a particular setting and switching to different
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ones as soon as the approach becomes inefficient, e.g. in the case of a DoS attack.
One issue with the previous strategy that became apparent in our evaluation of
Turtle Consensus is that this forces the protocol to sub-optimal strategies thus
bounding the protocol’s efficiency to the capabilities of these “back-up” protocols.
In addition, a more sophisticated adversary capable of compromising even a subset
of the system can learn and use the predetermined nature of protocols’ succession
to constantly drive the system to sub-optimal executions.
In this chapter we try to address these concerns by adding another degree of
freedom in the reconfiguration capabilities of Turtle Consensus. We present Mov-
ing Participants Turtle Consensus (MPTC), an extension to the Turtle Consensus
protocol that allows switching not only the protocols but also the set of processes
on which they run across different rounds of a single consensus instance. The con-
sensus protocol round and the processes participating in its execution form what
we call a configuration, which our approach changes unpredictably at each round.
While the configuration selection for each round is predetermined by a trusted
dealer, it is unknown to the processes during MPTC execution. Using existing
cryptographic techniques, we ensure that, only if sufficiently many processes col-
laborate during some round, the next round’s configuration can be determined.
This renders MPTC a valuable tool for building systems that can tolerate DoS at-
tacks in both crash- tolerant and byzantine environments where a bounded portion
of the system may be compromised.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 6.2 we describe the system model
and provide some background on the cryptographic primitives we use as well as
consensus protocols. In Section 6.3 we present our proposed MPTC protocol for
crash failures and demonstrate its correctness. We then extend this description
90
to address byzantine failures in Section 6.4. Then in Section 6.5 we present an
implementation of MPTC and describe how we used it to implemented a state
machine replication protocol. We describe our experimental results in Section 6.6.
Finally, we make our concluding remarks in Section 6.7.
6.2 Model
6.2.1 Processes and communication
Our system consists of a set of processes N that communicate using message pass-
ing. Each process is modeled as a state machine with a potentially unbounded
set of states that executes deterministic or non-deterministic transitions according
to some protocol. The protocol specifies the transition function of the processes
as well as the messages they exchange. Each process’s state consists of two com-
ponents, the public and the private or secret state. The public state contains the
description of the protocol that each process executes and any public cryptographic
keys associated with the process. The secret state contains any run-time state the
process manages during the execution of the protocol as well as any secret crypto-
graphic keys and/or shares associated with the process. We assume that all keys
and shares are stored in a tamper-proof cryptographic coprocessor which executes
all operations involving these keys. This ensures the integrity of any public or
secret keys used by each process.
Protocol execution and communication are asynchronous, meaning that there
are no bounds on the time it takes processes to execute transitions and deliver
messages.
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A process can be correct or faulty. A correct process faithfully executes the
protocol and is guaranteed to make progress as long as the conditions specified by
the protocol at any given step are eventually met. In this Chapter we will primarily
consider crash failures although we extend our techniques to byzantine failures in
Section 6.4. A faulty process may crash at any time after which it stops executing
the protocol. Up to the point of the crash, honest processes faithfully follow the
steps of the protocol. Communication between correct processes is reliable and
secure. This means that, in the absence of DoS attack (see below), messages sent
by some correct process to another correct process are eventually delivered. It also
means that messages are authenticated and cannot be tampered with or fabricated.
We assume an upper bound, fc < |N |, on the total number of processes that might
fail during the protocol’s execution. In this work we are not concerned with the
recovery of failed processes.
Finally, we assume the existence of a special process T /∈ N that from now on
we will refer to as trusted dealer or simply dealer. The dealer is only used during
initialization of the system during which it generates the initial public and secret
state of all processes. We assume that during this setup phase the dealer is correct
and that it can communicate via secure channels with any process in the system.
After initialization, however, the dealer does not execute any protocol steps or
exchange messages with any other process.
6.2.2 Adversary and attacks
We assume an adversary, A, that controls which processes fail and when. A is
limited on the number of processes it can fail by fc and cannot fail the dealer.
A can also control the delivery order of messages of all processes as well as delay
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communication, but must yield to the previously stated reliable communication
assumption.
The adversary can also issue denial of service (DoS) attacks against the sys-
tem that can fully saturate the bandwidth resources of at most fa < |N | correct
processes. This can effectively prevent the targeted processes from progressing in
the protocol’s execution since they can no longer communicate with the rest of
the system. A can change the targets of an attack over time and, in this way,
can introduce communication and computation delays on certain processes. The
adversary’s objective is prevent the system from making progress. From now on
we will denote by f the maximum number of processes that can be crashed or
under attack during the execution of the protocol, that is f = fc + fa < |N |.
In this work, we ignore DoS attacks that target other resources like CPU using
legitimate traffic. These attacks can be mitigated using rate limiting techniques
such as client cryptographic puzzles [11].
The adversary has read access to the public state of all processes as well as
the secret state of up to f processes. We call the processes whose secret state is
disclosed to A, compromised. While A cannot modify this state it can use it to
select the target processes of a DoS attack. Once A has selected the set of compro-
mised processes it can no longer change that set thus preventing A from accessing
the secret state of more than f processes. This static approach to compromising
processes might seem restrictive and unrealistic. We can make our model more
realistic by adopting the approach in [114] where the adversary can change the
set of compromised processes over time. This requires defining a window of vul-
nerability during which the adversary can compromise up to f processes but can
change its selection across different windows. We can then use proactive refresh-
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ing of cryptographic keys that runs periodically to recover compromised processes
across different windows. We will omit this discussion however, since this is not
the focus of this work.
Finally, we assume that the various cryptographic schemes we are employing,
like public key cryptography and threshold signatures, are secure in the random
oracle model.
6.2.3 Cryptographic primitives
Our protocol relies on Threshold Coin Tossing [21]. Here we present a high-level
description of this primitive that we will further formalize in Section 6.3. We
employ an (n, k, t) threshold coin- tossing scheme in which n parties maintain
shares of an unpredictable function, F , mapping an arbitrary bit string, r, to a
binary value {0, 1}. Each of these shares can be used along with an input r to
create a value that from now on we will refer to as function shares1. At least k of
these function shares of r are required to reconstruct the result F (r), while at most
t parties may be be compromised. From now on, we will use the term, function
share of F (r) to denote a function share of r generated with a secret share of F .
The scheme defines three functions: 1) The split function, which takes as input
a function F (represented as a bit string) and creates a set of shares as well as a
verification key for each of these shares. 2) The share combining function, combine,
which takes an input r of F along with k valid function shares of r and produces
F (r). 3) The share verification function verify, which takes an input r of F ,
a function share on r and the verification key corresponding to the share that
1The term used in [21] for these values is coin shares
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generated the input function share and determines whether the function share is
valid.
This scheme is based on threshold signatures [98] and can be used to create an
unpredictable sequence of bits while ensuring that it is computationally infeasible
for the adversary to produce an input r and k valid function shares that once
combined do not yield F (r). More formally, the scheme satisfies the following
properties taken from [21]:
• Robustness: It is computationally infeasible for the adversary to produce a
value r and k valid shares of r such that the result of the combine function
is not F (r).
• Unpredictability: Given a value r and functions shares from fewer than k− t
correct processes, the adversary can predict the value of F (r) with probability
at most 12 +  for negligible value  ∈ R.
The previous unpredictability property was extended to sequences of output
bits in [21], such that, given a sequence of values Ci for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , b} an ad-
versary with fewer than k − t valid shares of some Ci has negligible advantage in
predicting F (Ci). From now on, when we talk about unpredictability we will refer
to this extended unpredictability property of threshold coin-tossing.
Note that the previously described extended unpredictability property allows
us to share unpredictable functions in [{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}b] for any finite b. In
other words, we can model each such function as a random number generator that
can produce 2b different values and requires k processes to collaborate in order
to produce the random (unpredictable) value corresponding to some arbitrary bit
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string r. From now on, whenever we refer to sharing of functions or shares of
functions we mean the unpredictable functions that we described in this section.
Threshold coin-tossing can be implemented using any non-interactive threshold
signatures scheme that ensures unique valid signature per message as in [98]. A
direct implementation of this scheme can be found in [21].
6.2.4 Underlying consensus protocols
MPTC, like other consensus protocols, solves the problem of agreement. In this
problem, a set of possibly distributed processes, each of which is initialized with
some input value, unanimously and irrevocably output one of those input values.
More formally, let N be a set of processes each of which is initialized with some
value from a value set V . Each process can employ either of the following primitives:
• propose a value which allows a process to communicate its value to the rest
of the processes in N ,
• decide a value which allows a process to output a value
Every correct consensus protocol must satisfy the following properties:
• Validity: If a process decides a value, then that value must be the input value
of some process in N .
• Agreement: If any two processes decide they must decide the same value.
• Termination: All correct processes eventually decide.
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[42] has shown that in an asynchronous environment no consensus protocol
exists that satisfies all of the above properties when even only a single failure can
occur. To circumvent this result, a variety of protocols have been proposed [15,
29, 4] that use a probabilistic approach and can guarantee the previous properties
with the following modification on termination: All correct processes eventually
decide with probability 1. For the remainder of this work we will refer to the
non-probabilistic description of termination as definite termination and to the
probabilistic one as probabilistic termination.
A consensus protocol that implements the previous specification (using either
definite or probabilistic termination) even under the presence of t crash failures is
called t-crash-resilient. Note that our adversary can additionally perform denial-of-
service attacks which can fully saturate a bounded number of processes and render
them entirely unavailable. In an asynchronous environment there is no difference
between a crashed process and a process that is under DoS attack from the other
processes’ perspective. For this reason we say that a consensus protocol is correct
in our model if it is f -crash-resilient where f = fc + fa. From now on we will refer
to such consensus protocols as f -resilient protocols.
Each process executing MPTC may run different consensus protocols at dif-
ferent rounds. We denote the set of possible protocols each process can choose
from by P . Different consensus protocols make different assumptions under which
they are correct, that is meet the previously described specification. The crash-
tolerant consensus protocol of Ben-Or [15], for instance, assumes an asynchronous
environment and that each infinite schedule has a bounded number of processes
performing a finite number of steps. Other protocols make assumptions such as
bounds on the number of failures, different degrees of synchrony, the existence of
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failure detectors [26], etc. We consider a consensus protocol correct if it satisfies
either definite or probabilistic termination. For each protocol P ∈ P , we denote
the set of assumptions required to hold for P to be correct by AP . In other words,
if assumptions AP hold, then P satisfies validity, agreement, and termination. A
protocol P is a valid candidate for P if it is correct under both the assumptions
in AP and our previous model assumptions regarding failures, network reliability,
and adversary.
We only consider consensus protocols operating in rounds and we follow the
framework introduced in Chapter 5 for the specification of the round outcomes.
According to this specification, every process running a round of a consensus pro-
tocol ends up in one of the following states:
{D,U,M} × V
where states (D, v), v ∈ V indicate that the process has decided v, states
(U, v), v ∈ V indicate that no process has decided up to the current round, and
finally, states (M, v), v ∈ V indicate that while the process is not decided, if a
decision was made by some process then it must have been v. We will refer to
these states as round outcomes or simply outcomes. We denote by orp the outcome
of process p ∈ N at the end of round r ∈ N.
More formally the following invariants hold about the outcomes of processes
completing a round of a correct consensus protocol in P :
Invariant 4. If ∃p ∈ N , r ∈ N such that orp = (D, v), where v ∈ V, then for each
correct q 6= p ∈ N it holds that orq = (M, v) or orq = (D, v).
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Invariant 5. If ∃p ∈ N , r ∈ N such that orq = (U, v) for some v ∈ V then ∀q ∈ N ,
u ∈ V: orq 6= (D, u).
This framework facilitates the description of MPTC in the next section and
can be used to describe most consensus protocols in literature, including [15, 26,
64, 22].
6.3 Moving Participants Turtle Consensus
In this section we describe our Moving Participants Turtle Consensus (MPTC)
protocol. MPTC is an f -resilient consensus protocol operating in rounds such
that in each round a different subset of processes may run a different consensus
protocol. We start with some preliminary definitions and notation, then describe
the protocol, and finally sketch its correctness.
6.3.1 Participants and participant sets
MPTC is run by all processes in N . In each round, only a subset of N is actively
running a consensus protocol from a set of correct consensus protocols, P . Let Pf
correspond to the minimum number of processes required to run each protocol in
P . As an example, let P consist of the Ben-Or [15] and One-Third [28] consensus
protocols. The first one requires 2f + 1 processes to solve the agreement problem
tolerating up to f crash failures while the second one needs 3f + 1. Thus Pf =
3f+1. We assume that |N |  f and thus |N | > Pf for most reasonable f -resilient
consensus protocols.
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In the remainder of this paper, we say that a process runs or executes a protocol
in P when it executes a round of that protocol. We will refer to a process executing
a protocol in P at some round of MPTC as a participant or an active participant
of that round. Let PS = {S ⊆ N : |S| = Pf} be the set of all possible subsets
of N where each subset has size Pf . We call each such set a participant set. A
process may be a member of multiple participant sets. In each round r of MPTC,
only a single participant set, Sr, is active, that is executing a consensus protocol in
P . We assume that participants in each participant set of some round r, Sr ∈ PS,
are ordered and denote the i-th participant in Sr as Sir. The active participant set
for each round is determined by T during initialization, which we describe later in
this section.
6.3.2 Configurations
Before describing the initialization procedure and the core of MPTC, we need to
define an important concept that encapsulates the information required for a set
of processes to run a consensus protocol. We define a configuration of MPTC as
a tuple (P, S) ∈ P × PS. P ∈ P describes the consensus protocol to run along
with its initialization parameters. To better understand the information contained
in the initialization parameters, consider a protocol like Lamport’s Paxos [64] and
the core consensus protocol he called Synod. In Synod, processes play multiple
roles, such as proposers and acceptors. In that sense, P needs to encapsulate not
only the protocol under execution, e.g. Synod, but also information related to
its initialization such as mapping of proposers and acceptors to processes. The
participant set S ∈ PS corresponds to the set of processes that shall execute
the consensus protocol specified by P . Let the set of all possible configurations
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C = P × PS. Our approach implements a multi-party computation scheme for an
unpredictable mapping between natural numbers (rounds) and configurations. We
omit details regarding how to represent P since this is an implementation issue
and does not affect our protocol. We assume that |C| is bounded.
6.3.3 Initialization and trusted dealer
We are now ready to describe the initialization of our protocol, how we are us-
ing T to create an unpredictable sequence of configurations, and how the active
participants of a round can compute the corresponding configuration.
T is a special process that generates the configuration that each process in N
starts with in the first round. It also provides the processes the means to generate
configurations for subsequent rounds. To achieve this, T employs a (Pf , f + 1, f)
threshold coin tossing scheme like the one described in Section 6.2.3. Using this
scheme, T shares a function FS between the Pf processes of each participant set
S ∈ PS. Recall that threshold coin-tossing is based on threshold signatures, thus
when we say that T shares a function FS with each participant set, in reality it
simply selects a different public-secret key pair for each S ∈ PS and shares the
secret key. Given some round number r, at least f + 1 processes in S need to
collaborate to produce FS(r) while up to f of them may get compromised. f + 1
is both a sufficient and necessary number of processes to compute the result of the
function shared. T cannot be compromised, failed or attacked by the adversary.
At a high-level, T operates as follows:
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1. For each S ∈ PS the dealer picks a function FS : {0, 1}∗ → C and generates
a secret share, hqS, for each q ∈ S.
2. T picks a configuration C0 ∈ C.
3. T distributes C0 and shares to processes over secure channels. ∀S ∈ PS each
process p ∈ S receives hpS and C0.
Observe that each function shared by the dealer maps arbitrary strings to
configurations. This differs from the functions we defined in Section 6.2.3 which
map arbitrary bit strings to bit strings of some finite length b. Since C is finite, there
exists b = dlog2|C|e such that we can trivially obtain an onto function {0, 1}b →
C. Thus, the functions we need to share can be trivially obtained by the ones
supported by the threshold coin-tossing scheme. Note that, by this high-level
algorithm, a process in N will receive multiple shares, one for each participant set
it belongs to.
We now discuss how T generates the secret shares. Given model parameters P
and f , we define the split function of the threshold coin-tossing scheme presented
in Section 6.2.3 as follows:
split : [{0, 1}∗ → C]→ SPf
where [{0, 1}∗ → C] is the space of all functions from arbitrary bit strings to
configurations, and S is the space of secret shares. split breaks the input function
into Pf shares one for each process of some participant set. In other words, ∀S ∈
PS, split(FS) = {hpS | p ∈ S}. split can be implemented using Shamir’s secret
sharing [97] (Pf , f + 1). Note that in [21] their implementation is based upon
verifiable secret sharing since they are considering byzantine failures. In our model,
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processes cannot lie and messages cannot be tampered with. As a result, no
verification is needed within this context. We extend our approach to byzantine
failures in Section 6.4 where we introduce the required verification functionality.
Given a secret share, hpS, of some function FS : N→ C and some input, r ∈ N,
process p ∈ S can create a function share of FS(r) using the share generation
function, GFS : S × N → F where F is the space of valid function shares that
can be generated given a share h ∈ S and a natural number. We define, F pS(r) =
GFS(hpS, r). A straightforward implementation of GFS can be derived from the
signature share generation for threshold signatures [98].
We define the combine functions as:
combine : Ff+1 × N→ C
combine works by receiving function shares of some function FS and some input,
r and outputting FS(r) which corresponds to a configuration. More formally, let
FQS (r) = {F qS(r) ∈ F | ∀q ∈ Q,Q ⊆ S and |Q| = f + 1}
be any set of f + 1 function shares of FS(r), i.e. FQS (r) ∈ Ff+1. Then we have
that:
combine(FQS (r), r) = FS(r)
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6.3.4 Protocol description
We can now describe the operation of each process executing MPTC. MPTC is an
f -resilient round-based consensus protocol in which each round is executed under a
different configuration. Let Cr = (Sr, Pr) ∈ C be the configuration used for round
r, where Sr ∈ PS is the active participant set and Pr ∈ P the consensus protocol
specification for that round. Let opr be the outcome of a process p ∈ Sr running Pr
at round r. Let a special value ⊥ /∈ V ∪ C ∪ {{D,M,U} × V} represent the value
of an uninitialized variable.
We assume that all processes have common knowledge of N , f , P , C as well as
of the functions GFS combine. Each process p ∈ N runs MPTC with its identifier
and some value xp ∈ V as input and at any point in time maintains the following
state:
• its current round number, rp, initialized to 0;
• its proposal proposalp, initialized to xp;
• the outcome of a round, op representing p’s decision state and initialized to
⊥ at the beginning of each round; and
• the current configuration cp describing the currently known active participant
set and the consensus protocol the active participants execute; it is initialized
to C0, which is provided by T during the initialization phase.
• the secret shares, hpS, ∀S ∈ PS such that p ∈ S provided by T during
initialization.
We have organized MPTC description in phases. Messages exchanged between
processes carry the number of the phase, the id of the sending process, and the
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current round along with the payload. Messages are of the form 〈phase number,
process id, round, . . .〉. Each round, r, of MPTC works in the following 3 phases:
• Phase 1: Each process p ∈ Sr runs a round of the consensus protocol
specified by Cr. Let op be p’s outcome for round r. If op = (D, v), then
process p updates proposalp = v, decides v and never updates op and proposalp
again in any future round. If op = (M, v), then p updates proposalp = v.
Regardless of op’s value, p goes to Phase 2.
• Phase 2:
– Step 1 : Each p ∈ Sr computes function share F pSr(r) = GFS(hpSr , r)
and sends a Phase 2 message 〈2, p, rp, opr, F pS(r)〉 to all processes in Sr.
Then p waits for Phase 2 messages from Pf − f processes in Sr. Once
p receives enough messages from some Q ⊆ Sr, it proceeds to Step 2.
– Step 2 : If op = (U, ∗) where ∗ can be any value in V , then p updates its
proposal to a value v, selected arbitrarily from the outcomes contained
in the received Phase 2 messages. It also updates op = (U, v).
– Step 3 : Let FQS (r) be the set of function shares received from processes
in Q. p computes the configuration of the next round, r+ 1, as Cr+1 =
combine(FQSr(r), r) and moves on to Phase 3.
• Phase 3: Each p ∈ Sr sends a Phase 3 message 〈3, p, rp, op, Cr+1〉 to each
process in Sr+1. p updates its state: rp = r + 1, cp = Cr+1 and if it is still
undecided, it updates its outcome, op = ⊥. Each process q ∈ Sr+1 that
receives Phase 3 messages with the same configuration value, Cr+1, from
Pf − f processes, updates its proposal as follows. Let R denote the set of
outcomes received:
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– Case 1: If ∃o ∈ R such that o = (D, v), then q updates proposalq =
v, decides v, sets its outcome oq = (D, v) and never updates oq and
proposalq again in any future round.
– Case 2: If ∀o ∈ R it holds o = (M, v) for some v ∈ V then proposalq = v.
– Case 3: Otherwise, q selects an arbitrary outcome (∗, v) ∈ R where ∗
can be any value in {M,U} and updates proposalq = v.
Then q sets rq = r + 1, cq = Cr+1 and if it is still undecided, it sets oq = ⊥.
Finally, it starts the next round.
0 0 1
MPTC
round r 
Phase 1
M(0) U(1)M(0)
Configuration r Configuration r+1
MPTC
round r 
Phase 2
0 00
MPTC
round r 
Phase 3
Compute Cr+1
Figure 6.1: A round of MPTC consensus.
Figure 6.1 shows a visualization of the previous round description. MPTC
runs for an unbounded number of rounds and eventually reaches a state in which
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a decision is made and all correct processes can eventually learn this decision.
Messages from old rounds, either delayed in the network or sent by slow processes,
are ignored while messages from future rounds are queued to be processed when
the receiver reaches that round. Observe that in the previous description, processes
in participant sets that never become active take no steps. This will influence the
correctness discussion that follows in the next section.
6.3.5 Sketch of Correctness Proof
MPTC needs to satisfy the correctness properties of consensus protocols we defined
in Section 6.2. We will show these properties assuming that all the underlying
protocols used in P are f -resilient.
Recall that each protocol P ∈ P potentially makes additional assumptions
regarding the system model under which the protocol satisfies the previous prop-
erties. To guarantee correct execution of P under MPTC, the protocol must be
correct under the previous set of assumptions and those assumptions made in
Chapter 6.2. Note that this union may contain different assumptions about the
same property or aspect of the system. Let P be a consensus protocol for syn-
chronous systems. Then this union of assumptions will contain our assumption
that the system is asynchronous and P ’s assumption that it is synchronous. In
such cases, where one assumption is stronger than another with respect to a par-
ticular aspect of the model, we assume that the stronger assumption holds. In our
example that would mean that the system would be synchronous.
To facilitate our discussion we will introduce some notation to describe collec-
tions of assumptions for the protocols in P . Let A denote the set of assumptions
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that we made in Section 6.2. For each P ∈ P , let AP denote the set of assumptions
P makes about the system and its operation in order to tolerate f crash failures
while satisfying the correctness criteria stated in Chapter 6.2. Such assumptions
may regard the minimum number of processes required as a function of f , the
behavior of the network, the time and ordering of events, restrictions on the ad-
versary, and many more. In this work we will not attempt to accurately model
such assumptions since their descriptions vary greatly among different consensus
protocols proposed in literature.
Given A and P we define the set of assumptions that must hold in every
execution of MPTC as
AP = (
⋃
P∈P
AP )
⋃A
In other words, every execution of MPTC must respect the union of all assump-
tions made by every individual protocol used in Phase 1 as well as our model’s
assumptions. If an assumption is overridden by another, the stronger of the two
holds and thus weaker assumptions are excluded from AP . Under this definition of
AP we have that ∀P ∈ P every execution of P under AP , respects the correctness
properties of consensus protocols.
We will first discuss validity and agreement and finally we will argue about
termination.
Validity. In order to satisfy validity, MPTC needs to ensure that any value
decided must be the input value xp of some process p ∈ N . This is encapsulated
in the following lemma:
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Lemma 6.3.1. If a process in N running MPTC under AP , decides a value v ∈ V,
then ∃p ∈ N : xp = v.
Proof. (Sketch) A process running MPTC can decide during Phase 1 or Phase 3.
Any decision made during Phase 1 respects validity by correctness of each protocol
in P under AP . By the outcome and proposal update function of Phases 2 and 3
we described in Section 6.3.4, the processes’ proposals and thus possible decision
values can only come from the values of the outcomes produced in Phase 1. Since
validity holds during Phase 1, if some value v gets decided at some round r, ∃p ∈ N
whose input value in r is v.
From the previous lemma, we have that MPTC initialized with a valid P sat-
isfies validity under AP .
Agreement. Agreement is a safety property that ensures that no bad states
occur during the system’s operation. All correct consensus protocols must satisfy
the agreement property for the entirety of their execution. Thus we need to show:
Lemma 6.3.2. If any two processes running MPTC under AP decide values v and
v′ respectively, then v = v′.
Proof. (Sketch) Assume that ∃p, p′ ∈ N that decide values v, v′ ∈ V in rounds
r, r′ ∈ N respectively such that v 6= v′. We have the following two cases:
• Case r = r′: For two different processes to decide different values it must be
the case that outcomes (D, v), (D, v′) are computed after Phase 1 of r. This
cannot occur because each P ∈ P is correct under AP and therefore respects
agreement.
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• Case r 6= r′: W.l.o.g. assume r < r′. There must be a round r¯ such that
r ≤ r¯ < r′ in which all correct processes in Sr¯ compute either (D, v) or
(M, v) outcomes during Phase 1 and after which ∃q ∈ Sr¯+1 such that either
oq = (D, v′) or oq = (M, v′) and v′ 6= v. This is impossible: First, Phases 2
and 3 of round r¯ only allow processes to change their values to those of the
outcomes computed during Phase 1 of r¯, which in our scenario will be v. In
other words, all values received by processes in Sr¯+1 in Phase 3 of round r¯
will be v. Second, by the validity property of the protocols in P no outcome
(D, v′) or (M, v′) can be computed after Phase 1 of round r¯+1 if all processes
start with proposal v.
By contradiction it must hold v = v′.
Termination. Termination encapsulates the liveness or progress requirement on
consensus protocols by ensuring that eventually a decision is or can be made.
In our model (Section 6.2), we stated two versions of termination, the definite
and the probabilistic one. Notice that by definition, definite termination implies
probabilistic termination.
Recall that in MPTC each consensus round is run by a subset of the system’s
processes. It is possible that in an infinite execution some correct processes may
only execute a finite number of consensus protocols rounds and as a result not
be able to decide. Note that even if at least one correct process decides, all cor-
rect processes can eventually learn this decision by having the decided processes
broadcast a special decision message to all processes in N , which in turn decide
upon reception of that message. Therefore to guarantee definite (probabilistic)
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termination we simply need to show that eventually at least one correct process in
N decides (with probability 1).
MPTC termination depends on both the guarantees provided by protocols in
P and the properties of the interleavings of rounds of different protocols during
MPTC execution. The guarantees of each P ∈ P allow us to reason about the
properties that each MPTC round satisfies. We know that every round of P must
produce an outcome in {D,M,U} × V provided that AP hold. If not, P would
violate termination. Note that P should also satisfy termination under AP as
well, since AP makes the same or stronger assumptions. If P guarantees definite
termination, then in any infinite execution of P there must be at least one correct
process p ∈ N that produces outcome (D, v), v ∈ V in infinitely many rounds. If
P guarantees probabilistic termination then ∃ ∈ (0, 1] such that in any infinite
execution of P , infinitely many rounds have probability at least  for at least one
correct process to produce outcome (D, v), v ∈ V .
Given the previous guarantees provided by the protocols in P we can show the
following:
Lemma 6.3.3. Every correct process executing a round of MPTC under AP even-
tually completes that round.
Proof. To show the above we need to ensure that each active participant of some
round r completes the all three Phases. Phase 1 completes by the termination
property of each protocol in P with each correct process in Sr computing an
outcome with respect to the protocol specified by configuration Cr. Phases 2 and
3 rely on each correct process eventually receiving Pf−f messages which will occur
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due to our assumptions on network reliability and maximum number of failures
and processes under attack.
Lemma 6.3.3 ensures no process participating in any of the MPTC Phases ever
blocks. This non-blocking property of MPTC rounds, however, is not sufficient to
ensure progress. To reason about progress, we need to reason about the effect of
interleaving rounds of different protocols on infinite executions.
To reason about interleavings of consensus protocol rounds we need to reason
about configuration sequences and thus about the properties of the unpredictable
functions FS selected by dealer T for each participant set S during initialization.
Consider the case where P contains two artificial protocols P , P ′ such that any
process running P can only decide during an odd round, while any process running
P ′ can only decide on an even round. Assume a pathological infinite execution in
which Cr = (P, Sr) if r is even and Cr = (P ′, Sr) if r is odd. If we can define FSr for
each round r in such a way that the previous configuration sequence is generated
during Phase 2 of MPTC, termination cannot be achieved.
More formally, let the set of possible configurations, C, be based on a valid
P . We define a finite sequence I of configurations in C as conforming if execut-
ing MPTC under AP such that I appears infinitely often, at least one correct
process computes a decision outcome in infinitely many rounds. Any finite se-
quence of configurations in C that does not have the previous property is called
non-conforming. The case described in the previous paragraph is an example of
such a non-conforming sequence. From now on we will refer to finite sequences of
configurations in C as interleavings.
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The previous notion of conforming interleavings raises another restriction on
any implementation of MPTC and more specifically on the choice of P . In ev-
ery implementation there must be at least one conforming interleaving containing
configurations of C. We call an infinite execution of MPTC in which the corre-
sponding configuration sequence contains infinitely many conforming interleavings,
a conforming execution.
In the random oracle model, which we assume in this work, the configurations
sequences generated by the shared functions FS have the following property:
Lemma 6.3.4. Let C be a set of configurations based on a valid set of protocols P
and let FS be an unpredictable function for each S ∈ PS generated by T . Assuming
a conforming interleaving I exists in C, any infinite sequence of configurations cor-
responding to an infinite execution of MPTC contains infinitely many occurrences
of I.
Proof. Each FS used to generate the next configuration in Phase 2 of each MPTC
round is based on the threshold coin-tossing mechanism described in Section 6.2.
The unpredictability of this mechanism is based on the use of cryptographic hash
functions. In the random oracle model, given some input r these functions produce
a value chosen uniformly at random from their co-domain. In other words, at each
round r there is a positive probability for each configuration C ∈ C to be selected as
the next configuration to run. Therefore in an infinite execution, any interleaving
in C appears infinitely often. Thus conforming interleaving I appears infinitely
often.
By the previous Lemma we have that:
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Corollary 1. Assuming a conforming interleaving I exists in C, any infinite exe-
cution of MPTC is conforming.
We can now reason about the termination guarantees of MPTC, under the
assumptions that P is valid, that there is a conforming interleaving in C and that
AP hold during MPTC’s execution. Depending on the protocols executed under
the configurations of a conforming interleaving, definite or probabilistic termination
can be guaranteed. This is shown in the following lemmas:
Lemma 6.3.5. Let I be a conforming interleaving in C that contains at least one
round of a protocol satisfying definite termination. In any infinite execution of
MPTC there is at least one correct process that makes a decision.
Proof. By Lemma 6.3.4 we have that I will be executed infinitely often and so will
the round of some protocol P satisfying definite termination. By the termination
guarantees of P it must be the case that at least one correct process computes
a decision outcome (D, v) for some v ∈ V in infinitely many rounds. Therefore
eventually at least one correct process running MPTC decides.
We can state a similar lemma for probabilistic termination:
Lemma 6.3.6. Let I be a conforming interleaving in C that contains rounds of
protocols satisfying probabilistic termination. In any infinite execution of MPTC
there is at least one correct process that makes a decision with probability 1.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 6.3.5 except from the fact that the
rounds in which a decision can be made can only ensure that at least one process
decides with probability 1.
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Finally, we need to show the security properties satisfied by MPTC under
the previous assumptions. More specifically we need to show the following two
properties:
Lemma 6.3.7. Robustness: It is computationally infeasible for A to produce r
and f + 1 shares of r for any participant set S such that the output of combine
given the previous shares and value as input is FS(r).
Proof. It follows directly from the robustness property of the threshold coin-tossing
scheme we use for computing the next round’s configuration in each MPTC round.
The property is proven in [21].
Lemma 6.3.8. Unpredictability: Let CAr be A’s prediction for FSr(r) after learn-
ing at most f function shares for FSr(r) as well as any number of functions shares
for FSr′ (r′) for arbitrary many r′ < r. Then the probability of CAr = FSr(r) is at
most 1|C| +  where  ∈ R is negligible.
Proof. This property follows from the implementation of each FS as a (Pf , f+1, f)
threshold coin-tossing scheme and from the extended unpredictability property of
a sequence of coins produced by this scheme shown in [21]. By selecting the
length of the sequence to be m = dlog |C|e we ensure that the probability of A
predicting the next configuration having compromised at most f processes in the
active participant set is 12m +  ≤ 1|C| +  for negligible security parameter .
The previous termination discussion relies on the random oracle assumption
we made earlier. While this assumption is important for supporting the unpre-
dictability and robustness properties of our configuration generation scheme it is
not necessary if such properties are not needed. If we wanted to drop this as-
sumption, we would need to place additional restrictions on P and C to satisfy
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termination for MPTC. More specifically, we need to ensure that any interleaving
in C is conforming. Under that assumption the termination results still hold since
any infinite execution consists of conforming interleavings in which at least some
correct process makes a decision.
6.4 Extension to Byzantine Failures
Byzantine agreement model
Our MPTC protocol can be extended to support byzantine agreement. Under this
new adversary assumption, we call a process honest if it faithfully executes the
protocol. An honest process may crash during the execution but up to the point of
crash its execution does not deviate from the protocol description. Observe that
in our previous model (Section 6.2) all processes where honest. We call a process
correct if it is honest and eventually makes progress. This implies that a correct
process never crashes. Faulty processes, on the other hand, may deviate arbitrarily
from the protocol but cannot alter the secret state.
The specification of the protocols in P also change. Each protocol in P is
now a Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) agreement protocol. In this problem, the
objective is for all honest processes to agree on the same value. The correctness
criteria are as follows:
• Agreement: If two honest processes decide, they decide the same value.
• Validity: If an honest process decides value v, then v was proposed by at
least some process.
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• Unanimity: If all honest processes propose the same value v, then an honest
process that decides must decide v.
• Termination (Definite): All correct processes must eventually decide.
• Termination (Probabilistic): All correct processes must eventually decide
with probability 1.
Note that it now holds Pf ≥ 3f + 1. Also note that the byzantine failures
assumption is now part of our model assumptions set A and thus is included in
AP for any set of BFT protocols P . The round outcomes framework described in
Section 6.2 still hold under the following modifications on invariants 4 and 5:
Invariant 6. If there exists honest p ∈ N , r ∈ N such that orp = (D, v) where
v ∈ V then for each correct q 6= p ∈ N it holds that orq = (M, v) or orq = (D, v).
Invariant 7. If there exists honest p ∈ N , r ∈ N such that orq = (U, v) for some
v ∈ V then there is no honest q ∈ N , u ∈ V such that orq = (D, u) and u 6= v.
This new version of invariants refer to honest processes since faulty processes
may update their state arbitrarily at any point in time. Thus the processes’ out-
comes are meaningful only for honest and correct processes.
Trusted dealer protocol
Let P be a set of BFT protocols that tolerate up to f failures. The trusted dealer
initialization protocol now becomes:
1. The dealer assigns an identity for each p ∈ N using a public - key cryptog-
raphy scheme. It generates a public-private key pair, (publicp, privatep) for
each p ∈ N .
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2. For each S ∈ PS the dealer picks a function FS : N → C and generates a
verification key V KS and for each q ∈ S a secret share, hqS and a verification
key V KqS.
3. T distributes shares and keys to processes over secure channels. ∀S ∈ PS
each process p ∈ S receives hpS, V KS, and V KqS, ∀q ∈ S. In addition, each
process p receives (publicp, privatep) and the public keys of all other processes.
In the byzantine case, we need to use a verifiable secret sharing scheme like [40,
82] since we need a way to ensure that invalid function shares created by faulty
processes can be identified and discarded by honest ones. In such schemes, a
verification function is specified which typically works by receiving a value r, a
share of FS(r) and some verification keys that depend on FS and the secret share
used to generate the previous function share and outputs 1 or 0 indicating whether
the share provided is a valid share of FS(r) or not. We define our verification
function, verify, as follows:
verify : N×F ×K2 → {0, 1}
where K is the space of verification keys. Note that the verify above is modeled
after the share verification algorithm presented in [21]. Given a function share
F pS(r), it receives 2 verification keys, V KS, and V K
p
S ∈ K, the first produced using
FS and the second using hpS.
T can generate these verification keys using a secure cryptographic hash func-
tion, that is a function that is easy to compute but computationally infeasible to re-
verse. Feldman [40] provided some example functions with this property, with RSA
being one of them. We abstract away such details and denote by hash : {0, 1}∗ → K
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a function that has this property. T can use hash to generate the above mentioned
verification keys during phase 1 (after using split) as follows:
V KS = hash(FS), ∀S ∈ PS
V KpS = hash(h
p
S)∀p ∈ S,∀S ∈ PS
Note that our hash function takes different types of input, such as [{0, 1}∗ → C]
and S, but both are bit strings and so are the elements of K and F . While we
are using different domain notations to distinguish between functions, secret and
function shares, and verification keys, any implementation of these schemes is
working with bit strings.
Byzantine Tolerant MPTC
The Byzantine version of our MPTC protocol is similar to that in Section 6.3.4.
The processes maintain the same state as in Section 6.3.4 plus the cryptographic
keys generated by the dealer. All messages are signed using these keys. Messages
are of the form 〈Phase number, process id, round, signature, . . .〉 and processes
ignore messages with invalid signatures or messages not destined to them. The
protocol operates in rounds, the configuration of the first round, C0, is determined
by T and is known by all processes and each round proceeds as follows:
• Phase 1: Each process p ∈ Sr runs a round of the BFT protocol specified
by Cr. Let op be p’s outcome for round r. If op = (D, v), then process p
updates proposalp = v, decides v and never updates op and proposalp again in
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any future round. If op = (M, v), then p updates proposalp = v. Regardless
of op’s value, p goes to Phase 2.
• Phase 2:
– Step 1 : Each p ∈ Sr computes function share F pSr(r) = GFS(hpSr , r) and
sends a Phase 2 message m = 〈2, p, rp, opr, signm, F pS(r)〉 to all processes
in Sr, where signm is the signature of message m. Then p waits for
Pf − f Phase 2 messages with valid function shares from processes in
Sr. Each process receiving a Phase 2 message checks the validity of
the function share contained within using verify(r, F pS(r), V KS, V K
p
S).
Once p receives enough such messages from some Q ⊆ Sr, it proceeds
to Step 2.
– Step 2 : If op = (U, ∗) where ∗ can be any value in V , then p updates its
proposal to a value v, selected arbitrarily from the outcomes contained
in the received Phase 2 messages. It also updates op = (U, v).
– Step 3 : Let FQS (r) be the set of valid function shares received by pro-
cesses in Q. p computes the configuration of the next round, r + 1, as
Cr+1 = combine(FQSr(r), r) and moves on to Phase 3.
• Phase 3: Each p ∈ Sr sends a Phase 3 message m = 〈3, p, rp, op, signm, Cr+1〉
to each process in Sr+1. p update its state: rp = r + 1, cp = Cr+1 and if
it is still undecided, it updates its outcome op = ⊥. Each process q ∈ Sr+1
that receives Phase 3 messages with the same configuration value, Cr+1, from
Pf − f processes, updates its proposal as described below. Let R denote the
set of outcomes received:
– Case 1: If there are at least f + 1 outcomes in R of the form (D, v) for
some value v ∈ V , then process q updates proposalq = v, decides v, sets
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its outcome oq = (D, v) and never updates oq and proposalq again in
any future round.
– Case 2: If ∃v ∈ V such that at least f + 1 outcomes in R are (D, v) or
(M, v) then proposalq = v.
– Case 3: Otherwise, q selects an outcome (∗, v) ∈ R where ∗ can be any
value in {M,U} and v is the most frequent value in R, breaking ties
arbitrarily. q then updates proposalp = v.
Then q sets rq = r + 1, cq = Cr+1 and if it is still undecided, it sets oq = ⊥.
Finally, it starts the next round.
The previous protocol runs for an unbounded number of rounds, like our main
MPTC protocol, and eventually reaches a state in which at least f + 1 correct
processes decide and thus all correct processes can learn that decision.
Correctness discussion
The byzantine version of MPTC must satisfy the properties described above as
well as robustness and unpredictability. We again assume a valid P containing
correct BFT protocols, MPTC execution under AP as well as a set of configura-
tions C such that a conforming interleaving exists. The arguments for all of these
properties are similar to those in Section 6.3.5. In fact, the termination arguments
for the byzantine MPTC are exactly the same. Robustness and unpredictability
are also exactly the same and our arguments are mainly borrowed from the corre-
sponding arguments of the byzantine agreement protocol of [21]. For the rest of
the properties we have the following results:
Lemma 6.4.1. Byzantine MPTC satisfies validity.
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Proof. By correctness of the underlying BFT, any decision made by an honest
process during Phase 1 respects validity. A decision during Phase 3 can only occur
if at least f + 1 processes send the same decision outcome (D, v) for some v ∈ V .
For that to happen at least one honest process must have computed that outcome
during Phase 1. Thus that value must have been proposed by some process.
Lemma 6.4.2. Byzantine MPTC satisfies agreement.
Proof. Note that Phase 1 respects agreement by the correctness of the protocols
in P . Observe that honest processes can only decide during Phase 3 if at least
f + 1 processes have decided the same value. This means that if an honest process
decides v during Phase 3 of MPTC at least one honest process has already decided
v. Using similar arguments to those in Lemma 6.3.2, we can show that at any
point during MPTC execution any two honest processes that decide must decide
the same value.
Lemma 6.4.3. Byzantine MPTC satisfies unanimity.
Proof. Assume that all honest processes are initialized with the same value v ∈ V .
Since the BFT protocols in P are correct, honest processes getting into Phase
1 with the same value, v, can only compute outcomes (D, v), (M, v) and (U, v).
Otherwise it would mean that honest processes can change their proposals between
rounds of the BFT protocol in question (e.g., via the influence of the faulty pro-
cesses) and eventually decide a different value, which would violate unanimity of
the BFT protocol. Therefore, at the end of Phase 1 all honest processes will end
up with outcomes containing v. v will be the most frequent value in any subset
of Pf − f outcomes since Pf ≥ 3f + 1 and at least 2f + 1 processes are correct.
As a result Phases 2 and 3 will have all honest processes updating their outcomes
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and proposals to v. Consequently, all honest processes will eventually move to
subsequent rounds with v as their proposal and thus v will be the only value that
can be decided by some honest process.
6.5 Implementation
In this section, we describe a simple implementation of a non-byzantine version of
MPTC as well as a state machine replication protocol we built on top of it. To
implement MPTC we need to decide on the following parameters:
• The choice of protocol set P .
• The set of possible configurations C, which specifies not only the protocol of
each round but also its initialization.
• The configuration selection functions FS, ∀S ∈ PS, generated by the trusted
dealer.
• The implementation of the split function.
• The implementation of GFS and combine used during the main protocol.
Our set of protocols, P , contains only a single consensus protocol, an optimized
version of single decree Paxos [64]. A round of single decree Paxos operates in 2
phases. In the first phase an active leader/proposer gets elected and in the second
the active leader makes its proposal to the rest of the processes who may accept the
proposal. If the proposal gets accepted by a majority of acceptors, it gets decided.
Paxos tolerates f crash failures using 2f + 1 processes and thus Pf = 2f + 1.
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Similar to the implementation of Turtle Consensus [79], we avoid electing lead-
ers in each round by using a parameterized version of single decree Paxos in which
each round comes with a predetermined leader known to all active participants.
Assuming an ordering of the processes executing the protocol, we can set the leader
to be the process whose position in that order is equal to round number modulo
2f + 1. Under normal execution conditions, the previous optimization yields the
following benefits: 1) a decision within a single round-trip of communication since
it directly executes Phase 2 of Paxos, and 2) performance unaffected by contention
since the active leader is the only proposer.
We assume the weakest failure detector, W , presented in [25] in order to deal
with failures. If a leader failure is suspected by W , then the suspecting processes
will complete that round using M or U outcomes depending on whether they
have received a proposal or not, respectively. We implement W like we did in
Turtle Consensus, using timeouts with exponentially increasing timeout periods
when processes are inaccurately suspected. This way we ensure that there will
be enough rounds executed “concurrently” by sufficiently many processes which is
critical for ensuring termination in our Paxos variant.
In the description above we did not specify how the states of processes running
Paxos are turned into outcomes at the end of a Paxos round. The process executing
as the active leader can either decide the value it proposes during Phase 2, say v, or
fail to do so due to either failing or suspecting a majority of acceptors. In the first
case, it computes outcome (D, v). In the second case and if the leader did not fail,
it will timeout knowing that if a decision was made it must have been for its own
proposal, thus computing outcome (M, v), where v is its proposal in the beginning
of the round. Similarly, a process running as an acceptor can end a round either
124
having accepted the active leader’s proposal, thus computing outcome (M, v), or
timing out without having received any proposal, in which case it does not know
anything about the decision progress. In this latter case, we need to ensure that
if the acceptor becomes the next round’s active leader, it will make a proposal
consistent with already accepted proposals. The way original Paxos achieves this,
is through its phase 1. As a result our variant requires processes exiting the Paxos
round without knowledge of the round’s decision state to retrieve this knowledge
from the rest of the processes.
To avoid incurring another round of communication in our Paxos variant, we
piggyback this decision state retrieval onto Phase 2 of MPTC. Timed out processes
can use the set of outcomes received to update their proposal. The update proce-
dure is similar to the one used by processes that have computed outcome (U, ∗).
The main difference is that processes without knowledge about the outcome of the
round send a special “unknown” outcome. These “unknown” outcomes are ignored
by receiving processes unless all outcomes received during Phase 2 of MPTC are
“unknown”, in which case no decision could have been made. In the latter case,
the receiving process updates its outcome to (U, v′), where v′ is the receiver’s pro-
posal at the beginning of the round, and acts as in Phase 2, Step 2, Case 3. The
above optimization ensures that if the predetermined leader decides value v at
some round r and a failure prevents that decision to be learnt in r, then all pro-
cesses during Phase 2 of r will receive at least one (M, v) outcome. The receiving
processes will be forced to adopt v and thus future proposals can only be about v.
Our set of configurations is C = {(S, P )|S ∈ PS} where P ∈ P is the described
Paxos variant. We assume that for every participant set there is an ordering of
the processes in it. This is easy to achieve using the processes unique identifiers,
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and it facilitates the selection of leader of each configuration without having to
define additional initialization information in each configuration. Note that since
all rounds execute the same correct consensus protocol, all possible interleavings
in C are conforming.
Observe that in contrast to our prior work on Turtle Consensus we use the
same protocol across configurations. In Turtle Consensus (Chapter 5), different
configurations used the same 2f + 1 set of processes. As a result, the adversary
could try to track the current leader within that set of processes even if the leader
changed across different configurations. Therefore, a competent adversary could
eventually locate and force Turtle Consensus rounds to fail, which can lead to
poor performance. For that reason, we kept switching between a leader-based
(Paxos) and fully decentralized (Ben-Or) consensus protocols across configurations
to prevent the adversary from exploiting the leader vulnerability. A side-effect of
that approach, however, was that by falling back to a less efficient protocol (Ben-
Or) we only achieved sub-par performance compared to the graceful execution
using only Paxos rounds. With MPTC we do not need to employ such tactics
since the adversary now needs to scan through |N |  f processes before it can
identify the leader of our Paxos configuration.
The remaining parameters of our implementation are related to the crypto-
graphic framework assumed by our protocol. While we did not implement this
framework for our evaluation, we describe for completeness how we could do so in
the following paragraphs. For the actual implementation that we evaluate in Sec-
tion 6.6, we assume that all participant sets use the same unpredictable function
given to all processes via a configuration file. This file defines a sequence of con-
figurations, one for each round, that processes move to in a round-robin fashion,
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that is use the first configuration in round 0, the second in round 1, etc. Once
the last configuration in the sequence is used, the processes loop back to the first
one and continue from there. We emulate the restrictions that the cryptographic
framework imposes on the adversary by assuming that only the processes in Sr
and Sr+1 can learn Cr+1 and only after Phase 2 of round r completes.
A potential implementation for the unpredictable functions is having FS = F ,
∀S ∈ PS, where F is derived from the threshold coin-tossing scheme implementa-
tion based on Diffie-Hellman and presented in [21]. This approach hashes the input
value, r, using a cryptographically secure hash function, modeled as a random ora-
cle, and raises the result to a secret exponent. This exponent is shared among the
processes using Shamir’s secret sharing [97]. Finally, the result is further hashed
to obtain the value of F (r) using another cryptographically secure hash function.
Function split used by the dealer during initialization can be implemented using
Shamir’s secret sharing as mentioned above. In the case of byzantine failures, a
verifiable secret sharing scheme like Feldman’s [40] would be required in order to
implement both split and verify. Function GFS can be implemented by having
each process p hashing the input round number r and raising it to its secret share of
the exponent it received from the dealer. Finally, combine for (byzantine) MPTC
simply multiplies a set of f + 1 distinct (valid) shares and hashes the result. Note
that the combine computation is slightly more complicated and a detailed version
of its implementation can be found in [21]. Also note that one can alternatively
use any non-interactive threshold-signature scheme with the property that there
is only one valid signature per message, like the RSA-based scheme of Shoup [98].
We can then obtain the value of the function by hashing the resulting signature
computed by f + 1 signature shares on a message containing input r.
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6.5.1 MPTC-based state machine replication
We used the previous implementation of MPTC to build a SMRP, similar to the
one described in Section 5.4. While the components of the implementation are
similar, their interactions are different. There are three sets of processes, the
clients, the replicas R, and the participants N . The clients issue requests to
the participants who order these requests and forward them to replicas. Replicas
execute the received requests in the order established by participants and send the
results back to participants who then forward them back to clients.
Messages exchanged in this implementation are of the form
〈type, src, dst, (content- attribute-1, content-attribute-2, . . .)〉
where type ∈ {REQUEST, RESPONSE, DECISION, RECONFIGURATION}, src, dst ∈ N are
the ids of the communicating processes, and content- attribute-x, for x ∈ N con-
stitute the message payload. The different types of messages are as follows: A
request message is sent by a client to a participant and may be forwarded between
participants. It carries a deterministic operation to be executed by the service. A
response message is sent by a replica to a participant which then forwards it to
clients and contains the result of the execution of an operation issued via a request
by the client. A decision message is sent by a participant to a replica, and carries
a request along with its order of execution. Finally, reconfiguration messages are
sent between participants and are used to update the configuration of the MPTC
execution.
128
Clients
Clients are uniquely identified processes whose identities are independent from
those of the participants and the replicas. They connect to at least f + 1 partici-
pants to which they send requests of the form:
(client-id, request-number, command)
where request-number is a unique identifier for a particular request sent by this
client and command is an application-specific description of a deterministic op-
eration and of any arguments that operation requires. Note that each pair
(client-id, request-number) uniquely identifies a request received by the state ma-
chine and will be used by participants and replicas to track requests that are new,
under processing, or executed. Clients therefore maintain the following state:
• cid ∈ N, which is initialized with a unique value identifying the client.
• rsn ∈ N, which is initialized to 0, incremented each time the client issues a
new request and uniquely identifies requests for a given client.
• pending-requests ⊆ N, which is an initially empty set that stores ids of re-
quests the client has sent, but has not yet received response.
Our clients are modeled as state machines with the following transitions:
T1: Precondition: There is a command cmd that needs to be executed
Action: Send message 〈cid, pid, REQUEST, (cid, rsn, cmd)〉 to each participant
pid that cid is connected to; add rsn to pending-requests and update rsn =
rsn + 1.
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T2: Precondition: Received message 〈pid, cid, RESPONSE, (rsn′, result)〉
Action: If rsn′ /∈ pending-requests ignore; otherwise remove rsn′ from
pending-requests.
Participants
The participants receive requests from clients and are responsible for ordering these
requests and send them for execution to the replicas. To achieve this they spawn
MPTC instances, one for each request that needs to be ordered. Each instance has
its own identifier and decided requests are ordered according to the identifiers of the
MPTC instances that decided them. Only one participant set can be active at any
point in time. The participants of this set are responsible for creating consensus
instances. The active participant set may concurrently run different instances of
MPTC to deal with multiple requests. As in the case of Turtle Consensus [79],
we consider a global threshold W that limits the number of concurrent consensus
instances that have not yet decided. Requests that arrive when W concurrent
MPTC instances are running are queued and processed when some of the running
instances complete.
Note that in most common SMRPs clients typically send their requests to repli-
cas directly, which are responsible for instantiating consensus instances to these
requests. By disabling communication between clients and replicas we prevent
clients from launching DoS attacks on the replicas. This approach does however
have the issue that when a decision is made and the corresponding request is ex-
ecuted, two hops of communication are needed for the response to arrive at the
clients. In addition, it burdens participants with implementing functionality be-
yond running consensus that is commonly offered by replicas, like keeping track of
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the values already decided, maintain state for ongoing instances and other aspects
of the implementation, which makes it a less efficient approach. In this implemen-
tation, however, we are primarily interested in building an attack-tolerant SMRP
and thus made the choice of communication pattern we described above.
Each participant is connected to all replicas and zero or more clients. Apart
from the state required to run MPTC described in Section 6.3, each participant
additionally maintains the following state:
• pid ∈ N , initialized with the identifier of the participant.
• next-instance ∈ N, initialized to 0, stores the id of the next instance that will
be created.
• configuration ∈ R, initialized to C0 provided by the dealer, stores the con-
figuration that pid considers active.
• requests ⊆ N2×Ops, which is an initially empty set that stores requests that
have been received but not yet decided. Ops denotes the space of commands
and it is application-specific.
• instances ⊆ N3, which is an initially empty set that stores for each running
instance the id of the instance as well as the request identifier (cid ′, rsn);
the request identifier is pid’s input proposal for that MPTC instance.
• rstate ∈ {TRUE, FALSE}, initialized to FALSE, indicates whether the partici-
pant is currently under reconfiguration.
• responses ⊆ N3, which is an initially empty set that stores mappings of
requests and processes from which they were received. It is primarily used
to forward responses back to the processes that sent or relayed requests.
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Let configuration.participants denote the participant set of configuration and
let configuration.round denote the round in which configuration is used. Aside from
the transitions determined by the MPTC instances a participant may be running,
it additionally performs the following transitions:
T1: Precondition: Received message 〈REQUEST, pid ′, pid, (cid, rsn, cmd)〉 where
pid ′ is either a client or another participant, rstate = FALSE, pid /∈
configuration.participants and (pid ′, cid, rsn) /∈ responses
Action: Add (pid ′, cid, rsn) in responses and send 〈REQUEST, pid, p, (cid, rsn, cmd)〉
to each p ∈ configuration.participants.
T2: Precondition: Received message 〈REQUEST, pid ′, pid, (cid, rsn, cmd)〉 where
pid ′ is either a client or another participant, rstate = FALSE, pid ∈
configuration.participants, @(cid, rsn, ∗) ∈ requests and (pid ′, cid, rsn) /∈
responses
Action: Add (cid, rsn, cmd) in requests and (pid ′, cid, rsn) in responses.
Send 〈REQUEST, pid, p, (cid, rsn, cmd)〉 to each p ∈ configuration.participants\
{pid}. If |instances| < W then create an MPTC instance with instance id,
next-instance and proposal (cid, rsn). Then add (next-instance, cid, rsn) to
instances and update next-instance = next-instance + 1. Finally, run round
configuration.round of the new MPTC instance.
T3: Precondition: Received message 〈REQUEST, pid ′, pid, (cid, rsn, cmd)〉 where
pid ′ is either a client or another participant, rstate = FALSE, pid ∈
configuration.participants, ∃(cid, rsn, ∗) ∈ requests and (pid ′, cid, rsn) /∈
responses
Action: Add (pid ′, cid, rsn) in responses.
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T4: Precondition: Received message 〈REQUEST, pid ′, pid, (cid, rsn, cmd)〉 where
pid ′ is either a client or another participant, and rstate = TRUE
Action: If @(cid, rsn, ∗) ∈ requests add (cid, rsn, cmd) in requests. If
(pid ′, cid, rsn) /∈ responses add (pid ′, cid, rsn) in responses.
T5: Precondition: Received message 〈RESPONSE, rid, pid, (cid, rsn, result)〉 from
any replica or participant rid and ∃(∗, cid, rsn) ∈ responses
Action: For each (pid ′, cid, rsn) ∈ responses, send 〈RESPONSE, pid, pid ′, (cid,
rsn, result)〉 and remove (pid ′, cid, rsn) from responses.
T6: Precondition: On round completion of some instance (instance, cid, rsn) ∈
instances with outcome (D, (cid, rsn)) and (cid, rsn, cmd) ∈ requests
Action: Send 〈DECISION, pid, rid, (instance, cid, rsn, cmd, configuration)〉 to
each rid ∈ R. Then remove (instance, cid, rsn) from instances and (cid, rsn,
cmd) from requests.
T7: Precondition: |instances| = 0, ∃(cid, rsn, cmd) ∈ requests, rstate = FALSE
and pid ∈ configuration.participants
Action: Create an MPTC instance with instance id, next- instance and pro-
posal (cid, rsn). Then add (next-instance, cid, rsn) to instances and update
next-instance = next-instance + 1. Finally, run round configuration.round of
the new MPTC instance.
T8: Precondition: On round completion of some instance (instance, cid, rsn) ∈
instances with outcome (M, (cid, rsn)) or (U, (cid, rsn)) and there are still
instances that have not completed configuration.round
Action: Update rstate = TRUE.
T9: Precondition: On round completion of some instance (instance, cid, rsn) ∈
instances with outcome (M, (cid, rsn)) or (U, (cid, rsn)), next configuration
cfg and there no more instances that have not completed configuration.round
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Action: Update rstate = FALSE and configuration = cfg. Then send
〈RECONFIGURATION, pid, p, (instances, requests, configuration, instance)〉 to
each p ∈ configuration. Finally, update instances = ∅ and requests = ∅.
T10: Precondition: Received messages 〈RECONFIGURATION, p, pid, (instancesp,
requestsp, configuration′, instancep)〉 from a set of participants Q, |Q| = f+1
such that configuration′.round > configuration.round
Action: Update configuration = configuration′, next-instance =
max(instancep for p ∈ Q) and requests = requests⋃(∪p∈Qrequestsp). For each
p ∈ Q and (cid, rsn, cmd) ∈ requestsp add (p, cid, rsn) in responses. For
each (instance′, cid, rsn) ∈ ∪p∈Qinstancesp use Phase 3 of MPTC to update
the proposal of instance′ and create an MPTC instance (instance′, cid ′, rsn′)
where (cid ′, rsn′) is the updated proposal. Finally, add (instance′, cid ′, rsn′)
to instances.
Like in Turtle Consensus, MPTC is lazily instantiated for each slot. MPTC
messages carry instance identifiers so incoming protocol messages are properly
processed by the correct instance. If an instance has not yet been created, messages
for that instance are queued and processed when it is created. Transition T2
ensures that if a request creates an instance to one of the active participants then
unless the receiving participant fails, the remaining correct processes in the active
participant set will also receive and create an instance for that request. Transition
T7 ensures that if a proposed request does not get decided in one of the running
instances, a new instance will be created for that proposal.
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Replicas
The sets of replicas and participants are disjoint and |R| > f so at least one replica
is always correct. Each replica in R is run by a different process and maintains a
copy of state of the service implemented by the SMRP. Replicas are responsible for
executing the commands issued through clients’ requests in the order established
by the participants. This order is determined by the instance id’s associated with
each decision received. As in Section 5.4 we model this ordering as a sequence of
numbered slots with the first slot numbered as 0. All replicas are initialized in
the same state and since all commands are deterministic, executing commands in
order at all replicas ensures that they all end up in the same state. To provide this
functionality, replicas maintain the following state additional to the one related
with the service SMRP implements:
• rid ∈ R, initialized with the identifier of the replica.
• execution-slot ∈ N, which is initialized 0 and maintains the position in the
ordering of commands that should be executed next.
• decisions ⊆ N3×Ops×C, which is an initially empty set of mappings between
a slot and a request as well as the configuration under which the request was
decided.
• completed ⊆ N3, which is an initially empty set that stores mappings between
slots and ids of requests that were executed in those slots.
In addition, to those transitions defined by the deterministic state machine
implemented by the SMRP, replicas perform the following transitions:
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T1: Precondition: Received message 〈DECISION, pid, rid, (instance, cid,
rsn, cmd, C)〉 where C ∈ C, @(instance, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗) ∈ decisions, and
execution-slot ≤ instance
Action: Add (instance, cid, rsn, cmd, C) in decisions.
T2: Precondition: ∃(instance, cid, rsn, cmd, C) ∈ decisions, and execution-slot =
instance, and @(∗, cid, rsn) ∈ completed
Action: Execute cmd and let result be the outcome of the operation. Send
〈RESPONSE, rid, pid, (cid, rsn, result)〉 to each pid in the participant set spec-
ified by C. Add (instance, cid, rsn) to completed and remove (instance, cid,
rsn, cmd, C) from decisions. Update execution-slot = execution-slot + 1.
T3: Precondition: ∃(instance, cid, rsn, cmd, C) ∈ decisions, and execution-slot =
instance, and ∃(∗, cid, rsn) ∈ completed
Action: Add (instance, cid, rsn) to completed and remove (instance, cid,
rsn, cmd, C) from decisions. Update execution-slot = execution-slot + 1.
In other words, replicas execute commands one slot at a time as soon as they
become available. Decisions already received or executed are ignored or treated
as no-op. Note that there is still the issue of garbage collecting executed requests
in completed that are no longer needed. In fact, completed can get arbitrarily
large the longer the system operates. One solution would be to only track for
each client the largest request identifier used such that future decisions about an
already executed request number for a given client can be ignored.
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6.6 Evaluation
In this section we present an evaluation of MPTC using the SMRP protocol pre-
sented in Section 6.5.1. In Section 6.6.1 we present the experiment setup and in
Section 6.6.2 the performance results of MPTC under different attack scenarios.
6.6.1 Setup
We implemented MPTC and the SMRP described in Section 6.5.1 using C++. Our
testbed consists of 10 nodes in Emulab [110], each with 8 cores running at 2.4 GHz,
with 64GB of memory. For our experiments we used f = 1. Two nodes where
designated as replicas, six as participants, one as clients, and one as the attacker.
Nodes are connected by 1Gbps switched Ethernet as shown in Figure 6.2. Note that
clients and attacker can only connect to participants, while participants connect
to both replicas and clients. This choice was made to disable the attacker from
directly attacking the replicas of SMRP and thus degrading performance without
attacking the consensus mechanism. All communication between participants takes
place through Switch 1 in our topology. Switch 2 is only used for participant to
replica communication. We do not allow participants to communicate through
Switch 2 since this would prevent the attacker from saturating the participants’
bandwidth with respect to the MPTC execution. This would give MPTC an unfair
advantage and would not showcase the benefits of its reconfiguration capabilities.
All communication is over TCP/IP except for the DoS attack traffic, which is
entirely UDP/IP. One of the two client nodes is used by the attacker and the other
for creating legitimate client threads. As in Section 5.5 we use a separate node for
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attacks in order to limit the effect of bandwidth attacks on the clients’ ability to
issue requests.
Attacker
Clients
1Gbit/s
Replica 1
Replica 2
Switch 1 Switch 2
Participants
Figure 6.2: Experiment topology.
To simplify our evaluation, we set C to contain only two configurations such
that the corresponding participant sets are disjoint. The configuration selection
function provided by the trusted dealer (in our implementation by a configuration
file) simply alternates between these two configurations every time a round fails.
Note that the leader of each configuration depends on the round in which the
configuration is run as described in Section 6.5. We consider that the attacker does
not have this knowledge to make informed decisions regarding targeting processes.
Clients first connect to f+1 random participants to which they issues requests.
Once connected, each client executes the following loop: It issues each request to
all f+1 participants, waits for a response, discarding duplicate responses, and then
sends the next request. Note that by connecting to f + 1 participants, we ensure
that each client request reaches at least one correct participant who will further
forward the request to the active participants. We have client requests contain
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no-ops, which means that when a decided request becomes ready for execution,
replicas can immediately reply with a response.
The attacker creates a small number of attack threads, each of which targets
a single participant, selects a random port, and sends UDP dummy messages as
fast as it can. Note that these messages are not requests and are not processed
by our participants since they never get to the application level. As in our Turtle
Consensus evaluation, the goal of the attack is to prevent at most one participant
from participating in MPTC instances. The attacker can focus all threads on the
same participant or spread them across different ones. Since all attack threads
are created on a single node, the aggregate bandwidth the attacker threads can
saturate from the service cannot exceed 1Gbps.
We conducted experiments to test the throughput and latency of our imple-
mentation under normal execution and DoS attacks. Both metrics were measured
at the client side. For throughput we measured the aggregate number of operations
per second completed by client threads. Note that this is not the actual number
of instances completed per second by our SMRP implementation since the same
request might be decided more than once.
Other parameters of our experiment include:
• Duration: Each experiment lasted 1 minute. We found longer experiments
did not significantly affect our metrics.
• Load: The number of concurrent clients, which ranged in our experiments
from 1 to 64.
• Request size: The size of the command contained in each client request,
which we set to 100 bytes.
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• Attack message size: The size of the UDP messages send by attack threads
to saturate the participants bandwidth; we set that to 1KB since our exper-
imentation with our platform showed it is the smallest message size with the
best results for the attacker.
• Number of attacker threads: Each run involving a DoS attack had 8 attack
threads. We found that this number of threads yields best results for the
attacker even when all 64 clients are connected to the target sharing the
same link.
• Timeout: This is the initial timeout period used in our Paxos variant (Sec-
tion 6.5) for each MPTC instance. Every time a round of some instance fails
we double the timeout period for that instance.
6.6.2 Results
In our evaluation, we investigated three main scenarios. In the first, we run our
implementation of MPTC without any attacks taking place. The performance of
this scenario will be our baseline since any attack scenarios drain resources from
the system and thus is expected to perform similar or worse. This scenario is
labeled “No attacks” in our figures.
The second scenario has the attacker focusing the DoS attack on a single node,
the one that hosts the Paxos leader. This attack depletes the leader’s bandwidth.
In this scenario no reconfiguration occurs. More specifically, we assume that in
each round of MPTC the exact same configuration is chosen and the leader remains
the same. Note that this scenario tries to simulate the case where the adversary
can accurately track and attack the leader of the Paxos configuration. While
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Figure 6.3: Throughput as a function of load and various attack scenarios.
any reasonable implementation of Paxos would change leaders among the 2f + 1
processes, we set up the scenario to simplify issuing a very efficient attack. In our
figures, this scenario is labeled “Attack leader without reconfiguration”.
Finally, the third scenario uses an attacker who like in the previous scenario
focuses on a single node. In this scenario the attacker is given the initial position of
the leader but this time our implementation uses the MPTC version we described in
Section 6.6.1 where consensus instances execution alternates between two disjoint
sets of nodes. The attacker strategy here is to saturate the bandwidth of the known
leader. It keeps attacking that node for the entirety of the experiment run. This
attack is labeled “Attack leader with reconfiguration”.
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Figure 6.3 shows the throughput comparison of the previous three experiment
scenarios as a function of the load on the SMRP. Each point represents the average
throughput over 10 runs for each number of clients. In each of these runs clients
connect to random participants, which in turn means that performance will vary
across experiments. The first scenario is our best case scenario since the system
operates at full resource capacity. The second scenario shows that performance
suffers substantially when the Paxos leader is under attack. This is to be expected
since the leader’s participation is critical for making progress in each MPTC in-
stance. In the third scenario we observe the benefits of the reconfigurable version
of MPTC in action. The SMRP throughput is close to that of the No Attacks case.
The main reason for this behavior is that since the leader of the first configuration
is under attack and lacks the bandwidth to handle the valid traffic, some instance
will inevitably fail the first round since the remaining participants will eventually
time out. That will cause a reconfiguration that changes the active participant set.
The new participants will pick up the failed instances as well as future requests
and continue operating at full capacity. The minor deviations observed between
scenarios 1 and 3 are mainly due to the randomness of client distribution over the
set of all participants.
Figure 6.4 shows a comparison of the same scenarios as the load increases,
but this time with respect to latency. Observe that all scenarios behave similarly
with the latency linearly increasing with the load. This behavior is to be expected
since, as the load increases, the number of concurrent MPTC instances increases,
which in turn increases the latency for each client. After all, each of them has to
wait for a response to their previous request before sending the next one. As in
the case of throughput, we see that both scenarios 1 and 3 have similar latencies
while scenario 2 performs poorly. The reasoning is again the same. In the second
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Figure 6.4: Latency as a function of load and various attack scenarios.
scenario the leader under attack is slower in completing instances, which raises the
wait time for each client.
6.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we presented Moving Participants Turtle Consensus (MPTC), an
extension to the Turtle Consensus protocol presented in Chapter 5 that allows
running different consensus protocols, on different sets of processes, across differ-
ent rounds of a single consensus instance. By altering the execution configuration
of the consensus mechanism on the fly we believe we can better protect a system
under DoS attacks issued by adversaries that target configuration-specific vulner-
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abilities. We described MPTC for both crash and byzantine failure environments.
MPTC can deal with adversaries with bounded information on the system by
making unpredictable changes in the execution of the protocol. Thus, our proto-
col eliminates adversary’s advantage on predicting protocol and execution-specific
information that can be used against it.
We built a prototype implementation of MPTC in which we used the same
protocol across configurations and kept changing the set of processes executing the
different rounds. Our evaluation suggested that we can achieve the performance
offered by the most efficient consensus protocols even when the system is under
attack. Thus, MPTC improves on the core Turtle Consensus protocol not only
because it can handle stronger and better informed adversaries but also due to
its ability to maintain good performance without having to resolve to less efficient
consensus strategies.
There are various directions for further exploration and improvement of MPTC.
First, MPTC should be tested under more sophisticated attacks. In our evaluation
scenarios the attacker targeted the same node throughout the experiment so, once
the configuration changes, the attacker can no longer affect the system. In a real-
istic environment that is not the case. Even without the configuration knowledge,
the attacker can still pick another node at random when it detects that its attack
does not substantially change the performance of the system. As the number of
participants increases, however, the probability of a successful attack decreases.
We leave more sophisticated implementations of the attacker for future work.
While our design focuses on attack tolerance, we believe that MPTC can be
used in different environments where unexpected changes in the workload of the
system may lead to sub-optimal configurations and thus reactive reconfiguration is
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useful or even necessary. Such cases would benefit, however, from a more strategic
and dynamic selection of configurations, which the current MPTC design lacks
since it uses a predetermined sequence of configurations. We believe that finding
efficient ways of dynamically selecting and applying new configurations is key for
extending MPTC’s flexibility and applicability.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation we presented two different approaches for designing dis-
tributed systems that can adapt to dynamic workloads. First, we studied proactive
approaches in the context of cooperative caching for Online Social Networks. The
suggested framework considers a service that acts as a directory for content loca-
tions and maintains information on social links between the clients of the service.
The service provides the clients with hints about the location of requested con-
tent as well as where such content should be cached. We proposed two proactive
cache placement approaches that use these social links between clients to suggest
placement closer to the clients that are more likely to access it. One of these
approaches allows for tweaking the degree of proactivity which controls how ag-
gressively cache copies are created and thus the trade-offs between hit ratio and
bandwidth cost. The evaluation and comparison of these approaches to commonly
used reactive schemes was done via simulations on synthetically generated graphs
and workloads whose characteristics match those or real OSNs. Our experiments
show that substantial improvements can be achieved at moderate overheads us-
ing proactive strategies even under moderate churn, provided that appropriate
workload information exists. In addition, comparison with optimal strategies that
assume a-priori knowledge of the entire workload showed that proactive approaches
can approximate optimal ones well.
There are many directions for expanding the work on proactive cooperative
caching. One we consider to be of particular interest has to do with our para-
metrized cache placement approach, which used the replication factor parameter
to control the number of copies made for a requested object. This parameter was
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statically set during the beginning of each experiment. We believe that a rea-
sonable extension would reactively update the value of this parameter during the
operation of the system according to the hit ratio observed by the service to match
the characteristics of the given setting and workload. Thus, such an extension
could extend the applicability of our scheme to different content delivery settings.
Second, we presented a reactive moving target defense approach for dealing
with certain Denial-of-Service attacks against fault tolerance mechanisms based
on crash-tolerant consensus. Our protocol, that we call Turtle Consensus, oper-
ates by changing its execution configuration on-the-fly when no decision can be
made under the current configuration. Reconfiguration happens in two dimen-
sions. The first is the consensus strategy itself. This allows Turtle Consensus to
deal with DoS attacks that are tailored for specific protocols. The second dimen-
sion under reconfiguration is the set of processes executing the protocol. In this
extended version of Turtle Consensus, both the execution strategy and the partic-
ipating processes can be updated in an unpredictable but predetermined fashion
through cryptographic techniques. This eliminates the advantage of an adversary
on predicting protocol execution details even under partial compromise of the sys-
tem. Both the crash-tolerant and the byzantine tolerant versions of the Turtle
Consensus protocol are presented, though our implementation and evaluation only
considered crash failures. We tested the effectiveness of our approach with respect
to both reconfiguration components. Using a prototype implementation that alter-
nated between two dissimilar underlying consensus protocols, Paxos and Ben-Or,
we found that we can achieve excellent performance under benign scenarios and
acceptable performance while under attack, even under high client load. By addi-
tionally exploiting the changing participants capability of our design, we showed
experimentally that we can further improve the behavior of Turtle Consensus and
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maintain the performance offered by the most efficient consensus protocols even
when the system is under attack.
There are various directions for further exploration and improvement of Turtle
Consensus. One of the more immediate goals could be to test Turtle Consensus
behavior under more sophisticated attacks as well as under a byzantine failure
environment. As long-term goals, we consider that enhancing Turtle Consensus
to dynamically select a configuration in an efficient manner could substantially
extend its applicability in other dynamic settings.
Our study shows the importance of both proactive and reactive reconfiguration
capabilities in distributed systems. We focused on concrete settings and carefully
evaluated our techniques. We leave open to future research how the techniques can
be applied to other distributed systems, as well as how both reactive and proactive
approaches can be combined in the same system.
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